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Abstract 
For over two decades, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has attempted to 
craft a funding mechanism that would address loss and damage resulting from 
climate change.  With a steady drumbeat, AOSIS has developed and advocated a 
three-pronged proposal, emphasizing the need for more robust approaches to (i) 
disaster risk reduction and management, (ii) risk transfer, that is, shifting risk from 
one to another through insurance, and (iii) compensation and rehabilitation.  
Relative to the urgency and enormity of the climate crisis, the overall package is 
underdeveloped, with some members of the international community expressing 
reservation or outright resistance to its evolution.  Comparatively speaking, 
however, the former two prongs have received more attention, with risk transfer or 
insurance being the most developed element of the proposal.  As the specter of 
irreversible, slow-onset events—such as sea level rise, drought, and ocean 
acidification—looms larger and more concrete, means for rehabilitating vulnerable 
island states has become particularly important.  In this article, Professor Burkett 
explores the crucial elements of a funding mechanism to address the significant 
impacts of slow-onset events on small island states and provides a rationale for a 
compensation and rehabilitation mechanism, as well as a proposed framework for 
implementing it. 
Introduction 
For more than two decades, vulnerable small island states have sought a means 
to preserve their lives and livelihoods under threat of the impacts of climate 
change.  Formally organized as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), small 
islands have been the source of many novel approaches to climate governance 
within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter 
“Framework Convention” or UNFCCC).1  Perhaps because of their unique 
vulnerability to its impacts,2 AOSIS has led a steady drumbeat for urgent and 
 
1. See generally Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 509 (Fall 2009) 
(discussing the history and special status of AOSIS). “Indeed, the particular vulnerabilities SIDS 
face resulted in special recognition within the UNFCCC as well as advanced speaking rights, and 
a special linkage to climate-related financial assistance.” Id. at 537. See also W. Jackson Davis, 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): The International Conscience, ASIA-PACIFIC MAG. 
(May 1996), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20070610034008/http://coombs.anu.edu.au/ 
SpecialProj/APM/TXT/davis-j-02-96.html (stating that since its establishment during the 1990 
Second World Conference in Geneva, AOSIS has played a central role in shaping international 
policy on climate change). 
2. Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change identify 
least developed countries and small island states as being the most vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 
1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
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ambitious methods for arresting, and if not, adapting to climate change to survive 
some of the worst forecast climate phenomena.  With the specter of the most 
threatening and unavoidable impacts becoming more certain in light of current 
emissions rates, the calls for mechanisms to address climate-related loss and 
damage become more compelling.  This article seeks to respond to those calls by 
developing a comprehensive mechanism to compensate small island states that 
will suffer from devastating slow-onset events, such as encroaching seas, 
unrelenting heat, and acidifying oceans. 
From the earliest days of international negotiation—indeed, prior to the 
drafting of the Framework Convention—the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) anticipated the need to address the full panoply of climate challenges.  In 
addition to mitigation and adaptation, a method for rehabilitating communities in 
response to, for example, the atmospheric hazards of increasing heat waves is 
necessary and especially important for poor and vulnerable countries.3  It would 
require, as introduced and explicated by AOSIS over the years, two main 
approaches.  First, the international community would need to reduce the risks of 
future loss and damage through risk management—that is, by avoiding or 
minimizing climate impacts—in addition to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation.4  Second, states would need to address loss and damage at the time of 
its occurrence, now and into the future.  AOSIS’s proposal, referenced in the 
Framework Convention and widely supported by developing countries with 
growing developed countries’ support,5 conceives of and constructs an international 
 
3. Malia Talakai, Climate Conversations—Small island states need action on climate loss and 
damage, THOMSON REUTERS FOUNDATION (Aug. 30, 2012, 11:40 GMT), http://www.trust.org/item/ 
?map=small-island-states-need-action-on-climate-loss-and-damage/. 
4. UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Implementation, A literature review on the topics in the context of 
thematic area 2 of the work programme on loss and damage: a range of approaches to address loss 
and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, Note by the Secretariat, at 4-5, 
37th Sess., Nov. 26–Dec. 1, 2012, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.14 (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 
SBI Review].  
5. See Kim Chipman & Alex Morales, Islands Seek Funds for Climate Damage at UN Discussions, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2012, 3:29 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-03/islands-seek-
funds-for-climate-damage-at-un-talks.html (citing EU Climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard’s 
statement that the 27-member bloc has been supportive of the concept, though there are some 
reservations on how to proceed). Hedegaard explained, “We think that it’s not really mature 
enough yet to say this is exactly how we do it. We need some more work on that, but we have 
signaled very clearly to them that we are open to find a solution on loss and damage.” Id. Given 
staunch opposition to the proposal in the past, the fact that Loss and Damage took a central role 
in the Doha climate negotiations took many by surprise. Loss and Damage Reflects New Era of the 
Climate Talks, ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://aosis.org/loss-and-
damage-reflects-new-era-of-the-climate-talks/. The Doha decision called on the UNFCCC 
secretariat to carry out a number of activities that it must complete before the 39th session of the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, including an expert meeting in the fall of 2013 and the 
provision of technical papers on both the noneconomic losses related to climate change and the 
gaps in existing institutional arrangements relative to Loss and Damage. UNFCCC Conference of 
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mechanism, building on initial calls for an insurance mechanism for vulnerable 
island states, with which they can access funds immediately after a disaster.  That 
initial insurance proposal has evolved into a multi-pronged mechanism that also 
includes provisions for disaster risk management and—for climate impacts that 
are unavoidable and irreversible6—compensation and rehabilitation.  Now more 
than ever, AOSIS seeks integration of this proposal into the ongoing UNFCCC 
negotiations.7  
To date, the compensation and rehabilitation portion of the proposal has not 
received sufficient explication.8  Indeed, to the extent member states and 
researchers have considered it, the entire discussion of compensation has been 
hobbled by concerns regarding lack of political will and donor fatigue, at best, and 
explicit rejection of any measure that might vaguely resemble climate-related 
reparations, at worst.9  Indeed, some developed states have clearly expressed their 
distaste for any proposal that “may have the potential to create open-ended 
financial and legal liabilities.”10  Nevertheless, anticipating the increasing need to 
 
the Parties, 18th Sess., Decision 1/CP.18, U.N. Doc. FCCC /CP/2010/7/Add.1, (Feb. 28, 2013). For 
a discussion of the relevance of the Doha decision to the CRC and other Framework Convention 
initiatives on loss and damage, see infra Part III.A. 
6. Five Pacific Island states are listed as both small island developing states and least developed 
countries. They are Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Erika J. Techera, 
Climate change, legal governance and the Pacific Islands: an overview, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES 339, 344 (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth 
Ann Kronk eds., 2013). 
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.  
8. It also falls beyond the purview of other, related UNFCCC institutions. See Alliance of Small 
Island States, Montego Bay, Jamaica, Mar. 10-12, 2013, Informal Dialogue on Loss and Damage, 
6 [hereinafter AOSIS Dialogue] (citing existing UNFCCC institutions which were seen as having 
responsibilities that were relevant to loss and damage including, inter alia, the Conference of 
Parties, the Adaptation Committee, and the National Adaptation Planning Process). As explained 
infra Part III, because the compensation mechanism would respond to phenomenon to which 
communities cannot adapt, the Green Climate Fund, would also not be an appropriate venue for a 
compensation mechanism. See GREEN CLIMATE FUND, www.gcfund.net (last visited July 23, 2013) 
(the “Fund will promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient 
development pathways by providing support to developing countries to limit or reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, taking into account the 
needs of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change.”). 
9. Kim Chipman, Global Warming ‘Damages’ Spur Rift at UN Climate Treaty Talks, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-07/global-warming-damages-spur-rift-at-
un-climate-treaty-talks.html (quoting U.S. negotiator, Jonathan Pershing, stating that the U.S. 
doesn’t approve of any “liability-based structure”); Chipman & Morales, supra note 5 (quoting 
Saleemul Huq, a Bangladeshi scientist based in London’s International Institute for Environment 
and Development, who explained that U.S. State Department Envoy Todd Stern dodged a 
question on the matter after arriving at COP 18 in Doha, saying there are “some issues that are of 
concern there, but I don’t want to weigh into that without being certain”). 
10. Chipman & Morales, supra note 5. Huq explains, “Developed countries hear that phrase, ‘loss and 
damage,’ and they think of an international fund for compensation and liability—taboo subjects 
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seek aid or recompense for climate impacts, scholars and researchers have 
considered the possibility of a compensation mechanism and its legal and 
theoretical underpinnings.11  Even without a viable legal hook,12 however, there 
are numerous reasons for developed countries to agree to establish a compensation 
mechanism.13  With a sound rationale for a non-retributive compensation 
mechanism, discussed in Part III,14 there is also significant precedent in 
international practice, namely in the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC), that provides a useful blueprint for constructing a funding mechanism 
with the scale and sophistication to meet the SIDS’ needs. 
To advance the proposal for compensation and rehabilitation under the 
UNFCCC, this article explores in detail the feasibility and structure of an 
ambitious mechanism to compensate small island states at the advent of slow-
onset events.  Nested within the Framework Convention governance infrastructure 
and administered through the UNFCCC Secretariat, the Small Islands 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (hereinafter CRC) would disburse 
monies from a global pool to aid in rehabilitating individuals, communities, and 
countries affected by sea-level rise, ocean acidification, and other devastating slow-
 
for them. There’s strong push back. The U.S. has said there is no way they are going to do it.” Id. 
The U.S. approach contrasts with other more balanced responses from developed countries. U.K. 
Energy Secretary Ed Davey stated, “We should be cautious about saying we are strictly liable for 
some particular event or some particular change. That does not mean we should not work with 
others to help some of the very poorest adapt to the impacts of climate change.” Id. 
11. See, e.g., Ilona Millar et al., Making Good the Loss: An Assessment of the Loss and Damage 
mechanism under the UNFCCC Process, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 433 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory Wannier eds., 
2013) (exploring the legal basis for a loss and damage mechanism and providing an overview of 
the component elements that might respond to unavoidable impacts, including migration); Daniel 
Farber, The UNCC as a Model for Climate Compensation, in GULF WAR REPARATIONS AND THE 
UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION 242 (Cymie R. Payne & Peter H. Sand eds., Oxford 2011) (citing 
the asymmetry between carbon emitters and “climate victims” and stating that compensation 
claims are inevitable, and therefore, discussions of compensation are not “merely academic”). 
Professor Farber sketches out the loose contours of an international compensation mechanism in 
this chapter, id. at 242-57, but does not provide more than a preliminary thought-piece on the 
topic. See also Melissa Farris, Compensating Climate Change Victims: The Climate Compensation 
Fund as an Alternative to Tort Litigation, 2 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 49 (Winter 2009/2010) 
(introducing a no-fault compensation fund as an alternative to tort litigation to compensate the 
victims of climate change). 
12. See generally Maxine Burkett, A Justice Paradox: On Climate Change, Small Island Developing 
States, and the Quest for Effective Legal Remedy, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 633 (2013) [hereinafter 
Burkett, A Justice Paradox]. 
13. The need to persuade the developed world to agree to rehabilitation is the result of long-standing 
global North-South dynamics that consistently and systemically debilitate the global South. For a 
trenchant discussion of this dynamic in the context of human rights and environmental justice, 
see Carmen G. Gonzalez, Human Rights and Environmental Justice: the North-South Dimension, 
13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 151 (2015). 
14. See discussion infra Part III. 
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onset events.  Modeled on the UNCC, the CRC would operate consistent with 
clearly laid out claims categories and coordinate payouts triggered by the crossing 
of agreed on thresholds.  Although AOSIS has not limited its proposal to benefit 
small islands alone, this article structures the CRC around the needs and 
vulnerabilities—as well as the possibilities for rehabilitation—of small islands.  It 
demonstrates the feasibility and grave need to introduce and implement it.  
Further, it argues that the CRC might break a logjam between the highest 
emitters and the most vulnerable states.  Instituting a formal compensation 
mechanism would allow member countries to condition establishment of the CRC 
on the waiver of legal liability pursuant to terms agreed on when crafting and 
implementing the commission.  This may well quell the liability fears of certain 
developed countries and allow reasoned and collaborative discussion about funding 
for slow-onset events to proceed. 
This article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides more detailed background 
regarding small islands’ particular vulnerability to climate change.  That 
vulnerability has inspired longstanding and concerted efforts to push the level of 
rigor and commitment from other UNFCCC signatories.  The proposal for a 
funding mechanism to aid during times of disaster has matured over the years, 
with insurance receiving the greatest amount of attention and illumination.  Part I 
concludes by considering the possibilities and limits of an insurance mechanism to 
address the unique challenges of slow-onset events.   
After demonstrating that insurance cannot adequately reach beyond the 
demands of certain risks, Part II seriously engages the promise of a rehabilitation 
mechanism, based on the United Nations Compensation Commission, to address 
loss and damage resulting from slow-onset events.  The Security Council 
established the UNCC when Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait ceased in 
1990.15  Although the initiating circumstances were quite different, the means for 
compensating victims of the aggression are uniquely relevant and more easily 
adaptable to current climate-related circumstances.16   
Part III details the key elements of the Small Islands Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Commission after clearly stating the rationale for its creation as 
 
15. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc S/Res/687 (Apr. 8, 1991). 
16. See Farber, The UNCC as a Model for Climate Compensation, supra note 11, at 242-57 (asserting 
that international legal communities’ successful experience with the UNCC’s multilateral 
compensation mechanism would make obtaining agreement on adapting these approaches much 
easier than proposing a different one that lacked even a successful record of application). See also 
Won Kidane, Commentary, Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The 
Jurisprudence of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in the Hague, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 23, 35 
(2007) (noting that although notable differences exist, the Commissions benefited from the 
experiences of the UNCC with respect to claims categorization and adjudication).  
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well as the guiding principles for its fair, equitable, and efficient operation.  The 
article concludes with a discussion of the CRC’s benefits to small islands as well as 
the global community at large, which weighed against the possible drawbacks, 
militates in favor of the rapid establishment of this element of AOSIS’s 
comprehensive proposal. 
I. Climate Change and AOSIS 
A. Climate Present and Future for AOSIS Member Countries 
1. AOSIS Country Vulnerability 
A brief introduction to the AOSIS member states quickly reveals their 
heightened interest in the health and rigor of the Framework Convention.  The 
Alliance is a “coalition of small islands and low-lying coastal countries that share 
similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially 
their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change.”17  Within the 
UN system, AOSIS functions as an ad hoc lobbying and negotiating voice for 
SIDS,18 advocating on behalf of roughly 59 million citizens of 44 States and 
observer countries from across the globe, including the Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic 
oceans as well as the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and South China Seas.19  These 
low-lying coastal states share similar challenges to sustainable economic 
development, including: geographic isolation, limited resources, dependence on 
international trade, and pre-existing vulnerability to natural disasters.20  Further, 
although their GDPs vary wildly in some cases,21 most of these countries are 
 
17. About AOSIS, ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES, http://aosis.org/about-aosis/ (last visited Jan. 
5, 2015). 
18. Id. 
19. AOSIS member countries include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cape 
Verde, Comoros, Cook Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall 
Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Singapore, Seychelles, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
Observers include: American Samoa, Netherlands Antilles, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
Puerto Rico. See Members, ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES, http://aosis.org/members/ (last 
visited July 10, 2013). Thirty-seven are active members of the UN, constitute approximately 28 
percent of developing countries, and 20 percent of the UN’s total membership. About AOSIS, 
supra note 17. Together, SIDS communities constitute roughly five percent of the global 
population. Id. 
20. About SIDS, SIDSNET, http://www.sidsnet.org/about-sids (last visited July 14, 2013). 
21. For instance, Singapore’s GDP per capita is the highest at $61,400, whereas Guinea Bissau’s is 
$1,200. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?ga=1.188844395.154334249.141239 
4817 (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
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middle- or low-income countries, and five also rank among the least developed in 
the world.22  
AOSIS countries also have notable vulnerability to climate extremes.23  The 
Pacific islands are situated in one of the most natural disaster prone regions and 
are highly susceptible to—among other disasters—floods, droughts, and tropical 
cyclones.24  All SIDS are especially vulnerable to sea-level rise.  In the Caribbean, 
for example, about 70 percent of the population lives on the coast, and regional 
experts expect that many will have to relocate away from the coasts.25  In addition, 
predicted sea-level rise of roughly 3.3 feet by 2100 would “wreak havoc on the 
region’s tourist areas,”26 flood airports, destroy resorts, and—as is already 
happening—deepen the damage of saltwater intrusion on vital crops.27  Atoll 
nations, such as the Marshall Islands, are already experiencing high tides, or “king 
tides,” that surge over sea walls, repeatedly flooding its capital.28  In the summer of 
2013, in an unfortunate coincidence, the tides exacerbated the crisis situation in 
the northern atolls resulting from devastating drought, which damaged or 
destroyed local food crops, depleted water tanks, and rendered groundwater 
unsuitable for human consumption because of high salinity.29 
SIDS’ climate vulnerability is not only the result of the unique exposure to 
climate extremes but also of the severe impacts that these natural hazards mete on 
local and national economies.  Like many countries, a great proportion of SIDS’ 
economic activity occurs at the coastline, which is particularly true for tourist 
dependent island nations.  For example, 90 percent of Jamaica’s gross domestic 
product is generated within the coastal zone.30  Accordingly, any risks to coastal 
 
22. Techera, supra note 6, at 344. 
23. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Rep., Managing the Risks of Extreme Events 
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, 1-19 (2012) [hereinafter IPCC], available 
at https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf. 
24. Pacific Islands: Disaster Risk Reduction and Financing in the Pacific, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23176294~menuPK:1413
10~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited July 17, 2013).  
25. David McFadden, Coastal living in Caribbean likely doomed due to sea-level rise, E&E 
PUBLISHING CLIMATEWIRE (May 9, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1059980837/ 
search?keyword=coastal+ living+in+caribbean+likely+doomed+due+to+sea+level+rise. 
26. Id.  
27. Id. 
28. Paul Brown, Simultaneous Disasters Batter Pacific Islands, CLIMATE NEWS NETWORK (July 5, 
2013), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/simultaneous-disasters-batter-pacific-islands-16171. 
29. Id. (explaining that normally, the scant fresh water supplies are topped up from frequent evening 
rains, however, a devastating drought, which the locals blame on climate change, has reduced a 
desperate population to rationing water supplies to a liter a day). 
30. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Jamaica’s Initial Climate Change Technology 
Needs Assessment, 18, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/misc_/StaticFiles/gnwoerk_static/TNR_CRE/ 
e9067c6e3b97459989b2196f12155ad5/4ccc885176b94f949b83ed4b294061dc.pdf (last visited Jan. 
3, 2015). In fact, SIDS are the most at risk when losses, that is, economic damage from natural 
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activity will have significant consequence.  Not surprisingly, extensive data and a 
general consensus demonstrate that “developing countries are more economically 
vulnerable to climate extremes.”31  There are several reasons for this increased 
vulnerability, including: “less resilient economies” that depend more on natural 
capital and “climate sensitive activities” such as cropping and fishing; poor 
preparation for physical hazards; and an “adaptation deficit resulting from the low 
level of economic development and a lack of ability to transfer costs through 
insurance and fiscal mechanisms.”32  Accordingly, industrialized countries possess 
the highest income and account for most of the total economic and insured disaster 
losses, while fatality rates as well as losses as a proportion of GDP are greater in 
the developing world.33  For SIDS, a single disaster has immense ripple effects, 
severely stressing public financial resources,34 if not dwarfing annual GDP.35  As 
evidenced by Fiji in 2010,36 consecutive natural disasters in a short period of time 
multiplies the magnitude of losses and recovery demands and decreases overall 
socio-economic development.37 
2. Climate Forecasts, Novel Slow-onset Events, and Loss and Damage 
The climate forecast for SIDS is equally troubling.  Changes in the “frequency, 
intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of climate extremes” can result in 
 
disasters linked to rising global temperatures over coming decades, are compared against GDP. 
Nathanial Gronewold, US and China Most Exposed to Costs of Climate-Related Disasters, E&E 
PUBLISHING CLIMATEWIRE, (Mar. 13 2009), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2009/03/13/ 
stories/75480. 
31. IPCC, supra note 23, at 265. 
32. Id.; see also Millar et al., supra note 11 (stating that losses due to natural disasters in developing 
countries are 20 times greater as a percentage of GDP than in industrialized countries owing to 
the lack of risk transfer and risk sharing mechanisms, and consequently, the reliance on financial 
assistance from donor countries to respond to extreme events). 
33. See IPCC, supra note 23, at 5. Regarding disaster related deaths, from 1970 to 2008 over 95% of 
deaths from natural disasters occurred in developing countries. Id. at 9. “The relative economic 
burden in terms of direct loss expressed as a percentage of GDP has been substantially higher for 
developing states.” Id. at 270. 
34. Id. at 266. 
35. See id. at 270 (“In small exposed countries, particularly small island developing states, these 
wealth losses expressed as a percentage of GDP and averaged over both disaster and non-disaster 
years can be considerably higher, exceeding 1% in many cases and 8% in the most extreme cases 
over the period from 1970 to 2010 (World Bank and UN, 2010), and individual events may 
consume more than the annual GDP (McKenzie et al., 2005).”). See also Techera, supra note 6, at 
351. 
36. See, e.g., Map from U.N. Office for the Coordination for Human Affairs, Natural Disasters and 
Other Events Being Monitored by the OCHA Regional Office for the Asia Pacific (Mar. 17–23, 
2010), available at http://reliefweb.int/map/fiji/asia-pacific-region-natural-disasters-and-other-
events-being-monitored-ocha-regional-offi-0. 
37. IPCC, supra note 23, at 266. 
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“unprecedented” events.38  Further, “the crossing of poorly understood climate 
thresholds cannot be excluded, given the transient and complex nature of the 
climate system.”39  In other words, scientists anticipate that the known climate-
related impacts are set to shift in extreme and novel ways.  And, the biggest 
surprises, though not fully understood, may well come to pass.  The IPCC’s Special 
Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) links anthropogenic activities to known 
climate extremes, including sea-level rise.  Further, it has identified effects like 
sea-level rise as inevitable.40  Whereas some climate impacts are avoidable, either 
through mitigation or adaptation, many are no longer.41  These unavoidable 
impacts are ones that cause significant damage regardless of future measures 
taken to adapt.42  In addition to land lost to sea-level rise,43 for example, 
agricultural land lost to persistent drought,44 human health impacts of increasing 
heat events,45 and the entire collapse of the fishing industry due to increased ocean 
 
38. Id. at 7. 
39. Id. at 8 (“Assigning ‘low confidence’ for projections of a specific extreme neither implies nor 
excludes the possibility of changes in this extreme.”). 
40. See, e.g., id. (general discussion on the rise in sea levels); see also UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body of 
Implementation, Views and Information on Elements to be Included in the Recommendations on 
Loss and Damage in Accordance With Decision 1/CP.16, at 28, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2012/ 
MISC.14 (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/sbi/eng/misc14.pdf 
[hereinafter SBI Views & Information]. 
41. Roda Verheven and Peter Roderick identify three types of climate change damage: avoided, not 
avoided, and unavoidable. Avoided damages are those for which mitigation of emissions or timely 
implementation of adaptation measures were successful. Not avoided damages are damages that 
occur because of insufficient mitigation efforts and delays in accessing adequate adaptation 
funding or technology or challenges in institutional capacity. RODA VERHEYEN & PETER 
RODERICK, WWF-UK CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME, BEYOND ADAPTATION: THE LEGAL DUTY TO 
PAY COMPENSATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE 11 (Nov. 2008), available at http://assets.wwf. 
org.uk/downloads/beyond_adaptation_lowres.pdf.  
42. Id. See also SBI Review, supra note 4, at 24 (“The countries with the highest levels of residual risk 
are those that will be the least able to manage loss and damage in the future. They are also the 
countries that may be in need of the greatest support to manage loss and damage.”) (citation 
omitted).  
43. IPCC, supra note 23, at 15. In addition to observed changes in extreme coastal high water related 
to increases in sea level, it is “very likely that mean sea level rise will contribute to upward trends 
in extreme coastal high water levels in the future. . . . The very likely contribution of mean sea 
level rise to increased extreme coastal high water levels, coupled with the likely increase in 
tropical cyclone maximum wind speed, is a specific issue for tropical small island states.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). See also Mary-Elena Carr et al., Sea Level Rise in a Changing Climate: 
What Do We Know?, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A 
CHANGING CLIMATE 15 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory Wannier eds., 2013). 
44. See Mary-Elena Carr et al., supra note 43, at 44 (explaining that “[l]onger and more severe 
periods of drought are of particular concern for SIDS because such periods will reduce both the 
amount of rainwater collected directly and in the recharge of the freshwater lens”).  
45. See, e.g., IPCC, supra note 23, at 25 (explaining that “[m]odels project substantial warming in 
temperature extremes by the end of the 21st century. It is virtually certain that increases in the 
frequency and magnitude of warm daily temperature extremes and decreases in cold extremes 
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heat and ocean acidification46 all constitute unavoidable damage with which SIDS 
will have to contend.  Not only are their territories and economic engines predicted 
to face significant challenges, SIDS are home to some of the most vulnerable 
populations—indigenous peoples,47 internally displaced peoples, and climate-
induced migrants.48  In sum, there are unprecedented climate impacts that efforts 
to mitigate have failed to address and measures to adapt will fail to prevent or 
alleviate.  And, there are countries and regions in the crosshairs of these impacts. 
3. AOSIS Impacts 
AOSIS’s early calls for assistance identified the need to consider an expanded 
spectrum of necessary responses to climate change, anticipating heightened 
vulnerabilities over time.  Beyond efforts to mitigate and adapt, efforts to insure 
against disaster risks and compensate for unavoidable impacts are also necessary.  
(Fig. 1).  The latter two approaches seek to respond to the current and future loss 
and damage resulting from climate change-related events, for which mitigation 
and adaptation by definition are unable to address.  Together, loss and damage 
describe “the actual and/or potential manifestation of impacts associated with 
climate change in developing countries that negatively affect human and natural 
 
will occur in the 21st century at the global scale. It is very likely that the length, frequency, and/or 
intensity of warm spells or heat waves will increase over most land areas.”) (emphasis in original). 
46. See, e.g., Acidic oceans of the future show extinction, THE DAILY CLIMATE, July 9, 2013, available 
at http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2013/07/future-acidic-oceans (explaining that ocean 
acidification may create an impact similar to extinction on marine ecosystems; according to a 
study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,“[t]oday the ocean's pH is 
lower than anything seen in the historical record in the past 800,000 years, scientists say. As the 
acidity increases, organisms such as corals, oysters, snails and urchins have trouble pulling 
minerals from the seawater to create protective shells . . . [the study] buttresses ecologists' fears 
that such changes could ripple through entire ecosystems—and that ocean acidification could 
prove as consequential and catastrophic for the globe as any changes in air temperature 
associated with climate change.”). 
47. See, e.g., Techera, supra note 6, at 346 (explaining that “[s]ea level rise at the very least disrupts 
Pacific Islanders, who are largely comprised of indigenous peoples living traditional lifestyles at 
the coastal zone, and at worst will result in the displacement of whole communities”). 
48. IPCC, supra note 23, at 8. 
 Disasters associated with climate extremes influence population mobility and 
relocation, affecting host and origin communities (medium agreement, medium 
evidence). If disasters occur more frequently and/or with greater magnitude, some local 
areas will become increasingly marginal as places to live or in which to maintain 
livelihoods. In such cases, migration and displacement could become permanent and 
could introduce new pressures in areas of relocation. For locations such as atolls, in 
some cases it is possible that many residents will have to relocate.  
Id. at 16; see also AOSIS, Proposal to the AWG-LCA: Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss 
and Damage from Climate Change Impacts (2008), available at http://unfccc.int/files/ 
kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/aosisinsurance061208.pdf [hereinafter AOSIS Proposal] (arguing 
that to manage climate change effectively, the adaptive frameworks must address all categories, 
including unavoidable impacts such as migration). 
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systems.”49  Independently, loss refers to impacts for which restoration is not 
possible.  For example, the total destruction of coastal infrastructure due to sea-
level rise or the total collapse of a fishery due to lower ocean pH would constitute a 
loss.  Damage refers to negative impacts for which restoration is possible.  Damage 
to a coastal mangrove forest due to storm surge would fall under this category,50 
and presumably appropriate adaptation efforts or disaster risk management could 
mitigate or avoid impacts suffered as a result.  Both loss and damage interact with 
human systems,51 exacerbating their pre-existing socio-economic vulnerability.  
Both can halt or reverse development and “reinforce cycles of poverty,”52 with 
particularly dire consequences for the least developed.   
Whereas small islands are experiencing early and devastating climate impacts 
today, the prospect of future increasing loss and damage is especially concerning,53 
particularly as the world pushes beyond the worst assumptions regarding 
emissions and exposure variables.  Nevertheless, these impacts fall through the 
gaps in the climate governance regime.  The loss and damage discussion seeks to 
resurrect these critical concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. As the impacts of climate change accelerate, mitigation and adaptation 
are no longer sufficient response categories.  For present and future climate-
related disasters, risk transfer and sharing mechanism can aid recovery by rapid 
disbursement of funds.  Compensation should round out the expanded list of 
response categories.  For residual damage, for which adaptation is not possible, a 
funding mechanism to compensate and rehabilitate damage victims is necessary.54 
 
49. SBI Review, supra note 4, at 4 (“Loss and damage includes the effects of the full range of climate 
change related impacts, from increasing (in number and intensity) extreme weather events to 
slow onset events and combinations of the two.”). 
50. Id. at 3, 23. 
51. Id. at 5 (“[F]or example, sea level rise and glacial melt result from climate change stimuli, and 
these shifts in natural systems in turn result in loss and damage in human systems, such as loss 
of habitable land or freshwater.”). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. (“Future loss and damage is likely to increase, especially considering non-economic factors and 
the interlinkages of phenomena leading to cascading, transnational effects.”). 
54. See also Richard S. J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate 
Change Damages: A Legal and Economic Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1045, 1109-30 (2004). 
Mitigate Adapt Insure Compensate 
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In small island states, the civil engineering plans typical of adaptation projects 
funded by the undercapitalized Adaptation and Green Climate Funds will not 
suffice.55  At some point, the seawalls of the Maldives and Tuvalu will fail so 
consistently and completely that communities and countries will need 
compensation for rehabilitation from losses incurred.  Further, for SIDS, the 
cascading effect of disrupted customary institutions and subsistence lifestyles, 
which have aided resilience to climate variability in the past, could mean the loss 
of whole cultures.56  
For the present and forecasted climate impacts, the response regime is deeply 
flawed and will soon become wholly inadequate.  Presently, SIDS rely on ad hoc 
requests for disaster aid when a devastating event occurs.57  These ad hoc 
measures are often slow to arrive.  They also increase the likelihood of funders and 
communities introducing maladaptive measures in the wake of disaster recovery.  
As explained by the IPCC, “[a]n emphasis on rapidly rebuilding houses, 
reconstructing infrastructure, and rehabilitating livelihoods often leads to 
recovering in ways that recreate or even increase existing vulnerabilities, and that 
preclude longer-term planning and policy changes for enhancing resilience and 
sustainable development.”58  For all of these reasons, AOSIS has concluded that 
the absence of a comprehensive loss and damage mechanism for the most 
vulnerable is a “gaping hole” in the Framework Convention process.59 
 
 
55. See generally Burkett, Climate Reparations, supra note 1. 
56. See Techera, supra note 6, at 347 (citing the IPCC’s acknowledgement of cultural impacts having 
deeper effects than first appears through the damaging of culturally-informed flexibility and 
resilience). 
57. See Millar et al., supra note 11, at 438 (explaining that owing to the lack of risk transfer and 
sharing, developing countries are reliant on financial assistance from donor countries to respond 
to extreme events); see also Brown, supra note 28. 
58. IPCC, supra note 23, at 10. 
59. SBI Views & Information, supra note 40, at 4. This hole has existed in spite of consistent (w.c.) 
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B. The Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage 
To fill the hole in the Framework Convention, AOSIS has crafted a proposal for 
a multi-window mechanism to address climate-related loss and damage.  The 
proposed international mechanism would sit under the UNFCCC and have three 
distinct but complementary components.  The insurance component would help 
SIDS and other vulnerable developing countries manage financial risk from 
increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events in a timely manner.  
Today, commercial insurance is inaccessible for many SIDS or increasingly 
costly.60  The rehabilitation and compensatory component would address 
“progressive negative impacts of climate change, such as sea-level rise, increasing 
land and ocean temperatures, and ocean acidification.”61  These are the 
unavoidable, or residual, risks discussed in Part I.A.  The risk management 
component would facilitate and inform the prior two components by supporting 
and promoting risk assessment and management tools.62  AOSIS imagines all 
three components as interdependent and essential to the integrated approach for 
anticipating risk, transferring and sharing risk, and rehabilitating communities 
through disaster risk management, insurance, and compensation respectively.63   
The AOSIS proposal is particularly disadvantaged by the inclusion of a 
compensation mechanism, however, even if one considers the ostensible lethargy 
and intransigence that have generally impeded elements of the UNFCCC process.  
Whereas disaster risk management and insurance may comport with many stated 
and aspirational goals64 of the Convention as well as the inclination of many 
 
attempts to fill it. For a full chronology of attempts to advance AOSIS’s loss and damage proposal 
at the UNFCCC, see Alliance of Small Island States, Loss and Damage in the UNFCCC Process—
Workshop on the AOSIS Proposal, New York, New York, May 16–18, 2013 (on file with author)  
[hereinafter AOSIS Expert Meeting]; AOSIS Dialogue, supra note 8; AOSIS, Loss and Damage 
Briefing, 2012 [hereinafter AOSIS Briefing]; AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48; UNFCCC, 
Conference of the Parties, 18th Sess., Decision 3/CP.18, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (Feb. 
28, 2013) [hereinafter COP 18, Decision 3]. 
60. See AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48. 
61. AOSIS Briefing, supra note 59, at 1. 
62. See AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 4 (explaining that the risk management component would 
provide technical and financial support for “advice and assistance to countries on risk 
management techniques, facilitate the provision of support for the collection of weather data and 
analysis, provide support to risk assessments, identify hazards, recommend appropriate 
investments in risk reduction and assist in building capacity to manage climate-related risk and 
reduce risk exposure”). The funding for this component could come from the Adaptation Fund. Id. 
 This proposal, and the loss and damage discussion generally, has gained some traction in the 
most recent UNFCCC meetings. See discussion infra Part III. See also COP 18, Decision 3, supra 
note 59; AOSIS Dialogue, supra note 8. 
63. AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 1. 
64. Id. (citing numerous provisions in the Bali Action Plan the require the Parties to address risk 
management, including risk sharing and transfer mechanisms such as insurance). 
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powerful member countries, compensation rings as code for reparations.  The 
theory behind reparations is that wrongful actors should compensate individuals 
or groups that have been damaged by the wrongful act(s).  Linking accountability 
for these actions with compensation for victims “encodes” conceptions of fairness 
and rectification of past harm in international law.65  Accordingly, if a state is 
responsible for a wrongful act, such as breaking treaty commitments or customary 
prohibition against transboundary harm, it is required to make reparations 
through restitution, compensation, or satisfaction.66  
Although many plausible arguments for reparations based on alleged wrongful 
acts exist,67 AOSIS has not expressed any intention to seek legal liability by 
proposing a compensation component.  There are many independent reasons that a 
funding mechanism for progressive, negative climate impacts would be beneficial 
for all Framework Convention member countries, particularly the most vulnerable, 
discussed in greater detail in Part III.  Nonetheless, to avoid the “reparations third 
rail,” it might make best sense for AOSIS to proceed without elaborating further on 
 
65. Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: A New Frontier, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 478, 497 (2006). See Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.), Merits, 
Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, 47 (“[R]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not 
possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the 
award, if need be, damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or 
payment in place of it–such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of 
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.”). 
66. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1 & July 2, Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC]; Joy Hyvarinen, Climate 
Change, Transitional Justice and Loss and Damage, FOUNDATION FOR INT’L ENVT’L LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT [FIELD] (June 2013), http://www.field.org.uk/sites/field.org.uk/files/ 
papers/FIELD%20Climate%2C%20TJ%20%26%20loss%20and%20damage%20June%202013.pdf. 
“The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by 
the internationally wrongful act of a State.” ILC, at art. 31. “Full reparation for the injury caused 
by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.” Id. 
at art. 34. 
67. See, e.g., Joy Hyvarinen, Loss and Damage Caused by Climate Change: Legal Strategies for 
Vulnerable Countries, FOUNDATION FOR INT’L ENVT’L LAW & DEVELOPMENT [FIELD] (October 
2012), http://www.field.org.uk/sites/field.org.uk/files/papers/field_loss__damage_legal_strategies_ 
oct_12.pdf (highlighting new proposals about reparations); Jacob D. Werksman, Could a Small 
Island Successfully Sue a Big Emitter?: Pursuing a Legal Theory and a Venue for Climate Justice, 
in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 
409, 409-31 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds., 2013); Burkett, Climate Reparations, 
supra note 1, at 523 (defining climate reparations as “the effort to assess the harm caused by the 
past emissions of the major polluters and to improve the lives of the climate vulnerable through 
direct programs, policies and/or mechanisms for significant resource transfers, to assure the 
ability of the climate vulnerable to contemplate a better livelihood in light of future climate 
challenges”). 
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the compensation piece.  Indeed, novel notions for meeting the needs of slow-onset 
loss and damage using insurance have arisen. 
C. Addressing Slow-Onset Events through “Life” Insurance and the 
Indispensable Compensation Component 
One might understand the unavoidable or residual risks for SIDS as comparable 
to terminal illnesses.  These are forecast eventualities that, despite any attempts 
to remediate, will occur.68  In that regard, something like a life insurance policy, 
under the risk transfer and sharing component, might suffice.  Further, it would 
benefit from the already favorable perception of insurance as a viable and effective 
approach to loss and damage.69  Regional models also suggest that the learning 
curve to create and implement such a scheme may not be as steep when expanded 
to apply to slow-onset events.70 
Quite simply, a “life” insurance policy adapted to the circumstances of ocean 
acidification in the Caribbean Sea, for example, could read as follows: 
In consideration of the payment of the premium of [X dollars], 
the Y insurance company/facility agrees to pay, upon receipt of 
due proof of the [agreed upon threshold, such as the collapse of 
the coral reef system] within one year from the date of the policy, 
 
68. Even if one contributes to the climate “illness” through, for example, poor coastal land use 
planning in areas already threatened by sea-level rise, the community, country or region will 
succumb to the slow-onset climate event—though, perhaps more rapidly and painfully. Indeed, 
vulnerable country contribution to the loss and damage associated with a climate-related disaster 
is of concern. See, e.g., COP 18, Decision 3, supra note 59. This does not argue in favor of no 
funding or other assistance from the international community; however, it may sensibly militate 
in favor of a reduced amount of funding or assistance. 
69.      Risk sharing and transfer mechanisms include micro-insurance, insurance, reinsurance, and 
national, regional, and global risk pools. IPCC, supra note 23, at 10-11. It is generally viewed as 
an effective resilience measure, and one that can incentivize loss reduction and resilience building 
activities. See id.; Integrated Reg’l Info. Networks [IRIN], Insurance Only Part of Disaster 
Resilience, Says Climate Change Panel, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:14 EST), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/mar/06/insurance-disaster-resilience-climate-
change. See generally Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance 
Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2008) (examining the incentives that insurance products provide 
to influence the climate change-mitigating and adaptive capacity-building behavior of 
policyholders and other actors). But see Tom Mitchell, Seduced by Disaster Insurance? Don’t Dive 
in, CLIMATE & DEV. KNOWLEDGE NETWORK BLOG (June 19, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://cdkn.org/ 
2012/06/seduced-by-disaster-insurance-dont-dive-in/. 
70. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility has served as an early model for regional 
risk pooling. See THE CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INS. FACILITY, www.ccrif.org (last visited 
July 23, 2013); see also SBI Review, supra note 4, at 63-64; Hecht, supra note 69, at 1604. 
Other regional groups have attempted to follow suit, including the Africa Risk Capacity 
project and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative. See Linda 
Siegele, Loss and Damage From the Adverse Effects of Climate Change—a SIDS View on 
Africa, LOSS AND DAMAGE IN VULNERABLE COUNTRIES INITIATIVE BLOG (June 2012), 
http://www.loss-and-damage.net/4743. 
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the sum of [commercial value of the Caribbean reef system] to 
the 15 Caribbean countries of AOSIS. 
Conceivably, the Caribbean country members would pay a premium to the facility 
to receive the proceeds of the policy once it matures, which in this context would 
occur at the time of an agreed upon climate trigger.71 
Although seemingly straightforward and efficient,72 there are three chief 
drawbacks to applying insurance to the progressive and unavoidable events.  First, 
slow-onset events are not compatible with commercial insurance and reinsurance 
for the most part.  Quantifying risk is key to the healthy functioning of insurance 
markets.  Extreme weather events have become important to consider during 
insurance assessments.  They are often hard to predict, however, and they are 
increasingly costly.73  Recent UN estimates state that natural disasters over the 
last three years have caused $100 billion in loss.74  Second, and related to the prior 
point, the risk is increasing over time, threatening the long-term availability of 
commercial insurance.75  The continuing exit of private insurers in some market 
areas with “increasingly catastrophic” losses in localities in the developed world, 
including the United States and the United Kingdom, demonstrates the insurance 
industry’s own vulnerability to climate change.76  Insurers are declaring an 
increasing number of regions “uninsurable,” and have specifically cited sea-level 
rise, floods, and ocean warming as being of particular concern.77  For slow-onset 
events, the likelihood of occurrence increases over time, which in turn diminishes 
the utility of insurance as insurers are either unwilling to provide insurance or 
unable to provide it at an affordable rate.78  Finally, insurance never adequately 
 
71. The World Bank estimated the potential impact of climate change on all Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) countries at $9.9 billion a year, or around 11.3 percent of the region’s total GDP. 
Linda Hutchinson-Jafar, Caribbean Islands Fear Climate Change Threat to Tourism, THOMSON 
REUTERS FOUNDATION (May 4, 2011, 11:41 GMT), http://www.trust.org/item/?map=caribbean-
islands-fear-climate-change-threat-to-tourism/. 
72. At least when compared to creating a compensation and rehabilitation mechanism. 
73. Ilaria Bertini, Climate Change Is Making Parts of the World Uninsurable, BLUE & GREEN 
TOMORROW (June 25, 2013), www.blueandgreentomorrow.com/2013/06/25/climate-change-is-
making-parts-of-the-world-uninsurable/. 
74. Press Release, United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction, Economic Losses from Disasters Sets 
New Record in 2012, U.N. Press Release UNISDR 2013/05 (Mar. 14, 2013); Bertini, supra note 73. 
75. Others have included the absence of responsibility and accountability as a failing of the insurance 
approach. This point is outside the scope of the current discussion. In fact, considering the 
political milieu, the compensation and rehabilitation component is most viable if it proceeds 
without substantial reference or reliance on responsibility beyond the precedent/arrangements 
already established by the Framework Convention in principles such as “common but 
differentiated responsibilities.” 
76. IPCC, supra note 23, at 322. 
77. Bertini, supra note 73. 
78. Millar et al., supra note 11, at 461; see also Mitchell, supra note 69 (expressing skepticism about 
the long term availability of affordable products, if any, via the private sector, particularly in the 
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covers the full extent of losses, even when particular risks are easier to predict and 
quantify.79  “Intangible losses,” such as loss of earnings, loss of cultural heritage 
and identity, and loss of territory and livelihood, are not typically included in 
insurance products.80  They will, however, constitute significant losses for SIDS in 
the long-term climate forecast.  
An exploration of the possibilities and limitations of insurance demonstrate the 
importance of a carefully crafted compensation mechanism.  Insurance is not a 
panacea for climate-related loss and damage for reasons that inhere to risk 
transfer and sharing mechanisms.  These mechanisms are important for the rapid 
disbursal of funds and serve as an important pillar for resilience to acute disasters, 
in particular.  Beyond those risks, as discussed below, rehabilitation through 
compensation appears necessary. 
II. Completing the Multi-Window Framework: Taking 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Seriously 
The compensation component of the AOSIS proposal may be indispensable.  
Progressive, negative climate impacts can result in, among other things, the 
permanent or extended loss of useful land, irreparable damage to coral reefs, 
damage to water tables, loss of fisheries, and loss of territory with attendant 
human displacement.81  These uninsurable, residual risks will yield devastating 
effects on SIDS and other highly vulnerable nations.82  The effects might also 
reverberate well beyond the most vulnerable.  AOSIS negotiators argue, “[o]wing 
to the increased interdependence of the global economy and society, impacts in 
poor and vulnerable regions could cascade throughout the world.”83  Accordingly, 
AOSIS maintains that it would be “cost-effective as well as equitable for the 
international community to contribute to managing these risks”84 through a 
 
developing world and identifying a recent cap on reinsurance liability in Bangladesh as evidence). 
Even if available, insurance can also incentivize riskier or maladaptive behavior. IPCC, supra 
note 23, at 11, 322; Mitchell, supra note 69; Hecht, supra note 69, at 1604; Evan Lehmann, With 
Hurricane Season Underway, Lawmakers Want to Overhaul Disaster Spending, E&E PUBLISHING 
CLIMATEWIRE (June 13, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059982763/print (describing 
federal disaster approach as maladaptive in the U.S. context). 
79. See SBI Review, supra note 4, at 19 (“The insurance payout, however, does not usually cover the 
full cost of loss and damage.”). 
80. Mitchell, supra note 69. 
81. AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 6. Coral reefs, for example, hold significant importance for the 
tourism industry as well as local communities. In St. Lucia, coral reefs contribute to roughly 20% 
of the nation’s GDP through their benefits for tourism, fisheries, and for protecting shorelines. 
Hutchinson-Jafar, supra note 71. 
82. AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 6 (citing SBI Review, supra note 4). 
83. Id. at 7. 
84. Id. 
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vehicle such as a compensation mechanism.   
There is precedent for administering this kind of funding mechanism that 
demonstrates the viability of the compensation component—at least in theory.85  
Establishing a claims resolution facility could serve as a means for processing and 
resolving claims made for loss and damage compensation.86  Typically, these 
facilities address a large number of claims that require rapid and efficient review.87  
Further, and of great significance to the circumstances at hand, they often serve as 
alternatives to litigation and enable the conciliator to disaggregate liability from 
assessment and disbursement of damages.88  Most important, however, a 
“theoretical asset” of claims facilities is the ability to tailor the facility to the 
unique needs of each case.89  A practical asset is that a climate-related facility can 
coordinate most effectively the massive data collection and management required 
to assess damage at large geographic scales for impacts shared by many 
individuals, communities, and countries.90  This might also allow for long-term 
understanding of the loss and damage incurred and of how the facility might better 
aid in restoring the environment and human communities over time, if it is at all 
possible. 
A. Adapting the United Nations Compensation Commission  
Despite different initiating circumstances, the United Nations Compensation 
Commission is a helpful blueprint to resolve a multitude of climate-related claims 
 
85. AOSIS will continue to contend with political will, suspicion regarding liability and other hurdles. 
See discussion supra Part I.A. and infra Part III.A. 
86. For a discussion of the purpose and essential elements of claims resolution facilities, see Francis 
E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2005). 
87. See also David D. Caron, The Profound Significance of the UNCC for the Environment, in GULF 
WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION 265, 265-75 (Cymie R. Payne & 
Peter H. Sand eds., 2011) (stating that a claims body can streamline the recovery effort, and 
although courts typically focus on individual claims, mass claims process do as well with an eye 
cast on the larger situation). 
88. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1362. McGovern 
states that the facilities operate with the assumption that at least some liability exists, but the 
role of the facility is to focus on “residual damage issues not resolved through litigation or 
settlement.” Id. Here, however, I believe that liability should not operate as a major backdrop to 
the Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission. That said, relative emissions activity will 
arise when determining the relative contribution of member states. See discussion infra Part 
III.A. 
89. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1363.  
 One of the great assets of a facility for damage-related decisions is its great flexibility to 
meet the particular needs of a given situation. A design strategy, however, must 
consider, ab initio, all potential consequences of the design choices in order to ensure 
the predictability of outcomes and the equivalent treatment of claimants. 
 Id. at 1389. For discussion of predictability and equivalent treatment in the CRC, see infra Part 
III.A. 
90. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1363. 
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across a broad and diverse claimant pool.  At the end of Iraq’s invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council established the UNCC and paved the 
way for distribution of billions of dollars to compensate millions of claimants from 
over 100 countries.91  Through a series of resolutions, the Security Council affirmed 
Iraq’s liability for “any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and 
the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals, and 
corporations.”92  The funds came from a percentage of Iraq’s oils sales, in 
accordance with procedures and priorities determined by the Security Council.93  
The UNCC, with the authority of the United Nations, determined the total amount 
of damages and how to allocate those damages among numerous individual 
claims.94  There were six clearly defined claims categories, to which claimants—
individuals, corporations, states, and international organizations—could appeal 
for, in most instances, a predetermined fixed sum.  The UNCC Commissioners who 
ruled on the set of claims presented by claimants were “merely claims’ adjustors.”95 
There were other notable elements of the UNCC squarely relevant to 
compensating small island states.  First, the UNCC process was an inquisitorial, 
rather than adversarial one.  In other words, the task of the commissioners was 
largely fact-finding, based on available evidence and information provided by its 
own independent experts.  Their task was not one of faultfinding.96  Second, 
applying horizontal and vertical equity to the rulings was of great importance.97  In 
other words, similarly situated claimants who brought claims at the same time 
were evaluated and compensated equally (horizontal equity).  Similarly situated 
claimants who brought their claims later in time could also expect the Commission 
to evaluate claims and ultimately compensate equally (vertical equity).  Both axes 
would be critically important to an ongoing climate-based claims facility.  Vertical 
equity would be particularly important for those whose claims will ripen later in 
time.  This is the nature of the slow-onset phenomenon.  Finally, as noted in the 
 
91. David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Tradition of 
International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1 (1994).  
92. See Francis McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, 
14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 173 (2009). Iraq agreed to the UNCC in conjunction with the end of 
hostilities. Id. at 177. 
93. Id. at 171. Payment amount was generally related to punitive intensity and the ability to pay. Id. 
at 173. 
94. Id. at 176. “The UNCC evaluated each claim individually and the sum of all claims constituted 
the total damages.” Id. 
95. Bederman, supra note 91, at 1 (citation omitted). 
96. See infra Part III.A.2 for further discussion of the UNCC’s inquisitorial process. See also Peter H. 
Sand, Catastrophic Environmental Damage and the Gulf War Reparation Awards: The Experience 
of the UN Compensation Commission, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 430, 431 (2011).  
97. See McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, supra 
note 92, at 189. 
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prior section, the speed and efficiency of the UNCC was unprecedented and 
remarkable by international standards.98  It took roughly two years to establish 
the commission, publish the first set of decisions, distribute claim forms, and 
appoint the relevant commissioners.99  The entire claims review process was 
completed within four years of the Commission’s inception.100  Further, one of the 
most “significant and underreported success stories of the United Nations” was the 
UNCC’s ability to resolve two and a half million claims filed by individuals for 
displacement, personal injury, and property damage and loss.101  This serves as an 
excellent model for SIDS as they contemplate a system that can absorb the large 
number of claims that will inevitably arise.  And, like all elements of the climate 
crisis, swift action is essential. 
Although seen by some as sui generis,102 there is significant evidence that the 
UNCC was simply the next iteration of a long tradition of international claims 
resolution, to which the UN might add the Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Commission.103  To the extent that it departed from prior practice,104 particularly 
with regard to compensation for environment-based claims, the UNCC paved the 
way for the well-reasoned inclusion of harms beyond those to marketable 
resources.105 
 
98. Id. at 172. 
99. Id. 
100. Id.  
101. David Caron & Brian Morris, The U.N. Compensation Commission: Practical Justice, Not 
Retribution, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 187-88 (2002). 
102. See McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, supra 
note 92, at 177; Bederman, supra note 91, at 41 (explaining for reasons not squarely relevant to 
the CRC that it is doubtful that the UNCC structural model will become the standard for all 
future claims settlement and providing significant evidence of the UNCC’s position in a long, 200-
year history of international claims settlement). Id. at 1-2 (explaining that although the majority 
of scholarly opinion has characterized UNCC as novel, it is not as original or as unique as 
supposed). See generally id. (citing distinct claims commission between the United States and 
Great Britain, between United States and Germany, and between United States and Iran). 
103. See Bederman, supra note 91, at 27 (discussing UNCC is also akin to United States Claims 
facilities that, although also largely the result of discrete events, establishes the UNCC as 
consistent with common practice to date); see also Daniel Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims 
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1620-21 (2007); McGovern, Dispute System Design: 
The United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 92, at 175. 
104. Bederman, supra note 91, at 3 (“Although I do acknowledge that the size and scope of the UNCC's 
undertaking is extraordinary, the Commission's structure and jurisprudence is likely to be 
completely consistent with historic patterns. In truth, it appears that the UNCC has departed 
from these trends in only minor ways.”). 
105. There is also precedent for this in the U.S. context. See Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of 
Climate Change, supra note 103, at 1621 (“Under U.S. law, compensation for nonmarket damages 
to environmental resources clearly exists. The default measure of damages is restoration cost.”). 
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B. Compensating Environmental Harms: Lessons from the UNCC 
The UNCC was the first international claims facility to compensate for 
environmental damage beyond that related to property damage.106  The invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait resulted in “unprecedented environmental damage,” 
largely related to the hundreds of oil wells burned and millions of tons of crude oil 
spilled in the desert and the Persian Gulf.107  In addition, and particularly relevant 
to the AOSIS proposal, there were “massive environmental impacts resulting from 
the influx and transit of thousands of refugees displaced in neighboring 
countries.”108  
The UNCC’s resolution of these claims represented a significant advance for 
environmental concerns and tracked international law’s growing concern with 
environmental damage that is not readily quantifiable but nonetheless 
important.109  International claims facilities have significant experience dealing 
with environmental claims that are property-based by nature.  In other words, 
there is significant precedent for managing claims resulting from environmental 
disruption that causes damage to real property, crops, health or other elements of 
the environment that also have commercial value.110  The UNCC broadened the 
scope of compensation to include claims based on “the common concern for the 
protection and conservation of the environment.”111  This was a novel expansion of 
the compensable boundaries of environmental harm. 
The Working Group charged with elaborating on the contours of the 
environmental claims category employed quite a broad and flexible interpretation 
 
106. In practice, “the claims of governments regarding the environment were relatively few in number, 
relatively large in amount and handled in an individualized manner.” Hans Van Houtte et al., 
The United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 321, 324 
(Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006). “$5.26 billion of environmental damages (awarded by the UNCC as of 
June 2005, and disbursed in full as of July 2010) are the largest award ever made in the history of 
international environmental law.” Sand, supra note 96, at 430. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. See Caron, supra note 87, at 275; Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 
supra note 103, at 1620 (“[G]rowing international recognition that ‘environmental damages will 
often extend beyond [what] can be readily quantified in terms of clean-up costs or property 
devaluation.’ Thus, harm to ‘environmental values (biodiversity, amenity, etc.—sometimes 
referred to as ‘non-use values') is, as a matter of principle, no less real and compensable than 
damage to property, though it may be difficult to quantify.”) (quoting ILC, supra note 66, 
commentary to art. 36(2), ¶ 15). 
110. See Caron, supra 87, at 267. 
111. U.N. Env’t Programme [UNEP], Report of the Working Group of Experts on Liability and 
Compensation for Environmental Damages Arising from Military Activities, in LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE: COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS (Alexandre 
Timoshenko ed., 1998) [hereinafter UNEP]. See also Sand, supra note 96, at 431; Caron, supra 
note 87, at 268. 
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of compensable environmental claims.112  This bodes well for the feasibility of a 
compensation commission in response to climate change.  Although concerned with 
wartime environmental degradation, the UNCC recognized claims that parallel the 
circumstances of SIDS vis-à-vis slow-onset events.  For example, the abatement 
and prevention of environmental damage, the reasonable monitoring and 
assessment of environmental damage for abating harm and restoring the 
environment, as well as the depletion of and damage to natural resources were all 
compensable claims that are squarely relevant to vulnerable small islands and 
AOSIS.113  
III. The Small Islands Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Commission 
To blunt the disruption and devastation of unavoidable climate impacts, the 
United Nations should establish the Small Islands Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Commission (CRC).  The CRC would process claims and pay 
compensation for loss, damage, and injuries to or displacement of individuals and 
governments that suffer as a direct result of catastrophic slow-onset events.  Even 
though its mandate appears sweeping and ambitious, the UNCC demonstrates its 
feasibility, and moreover, the CRC is consistent with the stated goals and 
commitments of the Framework Convention.114   
 
112. UNEP, supra note 111. 
113. See, e.g., Sand, supra note 96, at 430 (noting that many have referred to the UNCC experience as 
a potential model for environmental claims settlements; however, while “there may be 
precedential lessons . . . the bulk of UNCC claims (some 90% of over $52 billion awarded)—
including thousands of individual claims from Kuwaitis and displaced foreign workers, and huge 
amounts of corporate business losses—concerned non-environmental damage”). See also id. at 432 
(noting that “[b]oth the jurisprudence and the methodology of the UNCC/F4 Panel are of direct 
relevance to more recent cases of catastrophic environmental damage,” including the 2010 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill). See also Robin L. Juni, The United Nations Compensation 
Commission as a Model for an International Environmental Court, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 53 (2000) 
(arguing that elements of the UNCC process provide guidance for the creation of an international 
environmental court). The inclusion of environmental claims has inspired the application of the 
UNCC approach in other contexts, including the proposed creation of an international 
environmental court. See generally Keith P. McManus, Civil Liability for Wartime Environmental 
Damage: Adapting the United Nations Compensation Commission for the Iraq War, 33 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 417 (2006) (exploring the modifications that could make the UNCC a 
successful mechanism for assessing civil liability for wartime environmental damage). 
114. See AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48. AOSIS notes that many elements of their multi-window 
proposal resonate with recommendations contained in the UNFCCC Technical Paper on 
Mechanisms to manage financial risk from direct impacts of climate change in developing 
countries (FCCC/TP/2008/9), and in particular Scheme C, paragraphs 336 and following for a 
Climate Risk Management Mechanism. Id. at 8. Further, “Scheme C aims to provide a long-term 
approach at the global level and recognizes that support is needed from the international 
community where underlying risks may be uninsurable due to the high degree of hazard or the 
inability of the Parties at risk to pay an adequate premium.” Id. 
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The CRC would perform three primary functions.  It would (i) determine the 
total amount of damages to award for a given event, such as the collapse of a reef 
system due to low ocean pH, (ii) allocate payment to relevant claimants, and (iii) 
develop and manage an innovative system of post-award auditing of larger claims 
to ensure adequate environmental remediation and inform more sophisticated 
approaches for later rehabilitation.115  
A. The Theoretical Basis for the CRC: Guiding Principles and 
Antecedent Questions 
The reasons for crafting and implementing the CRC are legion.  
Notwithstanding copious arguments for reparations based on liability under 
international law,116 there are weighty reasons to establish a compensation 
commission based on the Framework Convention.  There are also sound reasons 
based on the maintenance of global stability, which is also of great interest to the 
largest emitters.117  More than 190 countries established the UNFCCC to meet the 
many significant demands of slow-onset phenomena.  The Framework Convention, 
at least in theory, sanctions a number of ambitious and viable actions to slow 
climate change and ease the impacts of unavoidable climate change.  It would be 
naïve to suggest, however, that the Framework Convention can do all it states to 
do, at least without significant political opposition.  That said, its failure, if even 
partial, portends grave consequences for the global community, including the most 
intransigent of the largest carbon emitters.   
This section notes key recent developments under the UNFCCC that justify 
 
115. Technological facilities would support all three functions of the CRC. For further discussion of this 
indispensable piece of the CRC and the overall multi-window mechanism, see discussion infra 
Part III.B. David Caron identifies this as one of the key lessons from the UNCC, explaining,  
 [G]iven the previous lessons and the assumed presence of a significant disaster, it 
should likewise be assumed that the claims process extends far into the future. This is 
particularly the case in terms of any follow-up program where the claims institution 
monitors the performance of the agent; that is, tracks the execution of an agent's stated 
plan to address environmental concerns. 
Caron, supra note 87, at 274. 
116. See e.g., Millar et al., supra note 11, at 440-41; Tol & Verheyen, supra note 54, at 1109-11 (citing 
the no harm rule and law of state responsibility under customary international law); Burkett, 
Climate Reparations, supra note 1; AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48 (citing the principle of state 
responsibility, which requires the cessation of wrongful activity and reparation for damage caused 
by the wrongful act); UNEP, supra note 111, at 119; see also ILC, supra note 66, at arts. 30-39. 
117. UNFCCC, supra note 2, at arts. 4.1(e), 4.4, 4.8. (“[T]he Parties shall give full consideration to 
what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance 
and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country 
Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or impact of the implementation of 
response measures, especially on . . . [s]mall island countries. . . .”); see Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(14), Dec. 10, 1997, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.2, reprinted in 37 ILM 22 (1998); see also Millar et al., supra note 11, at 438. 
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imposition of a compensation mechanism.  A discussion of guiding principles for 
the operation of the CRC and a response to important antecedent questions—such 
as who will fund it, who will benefit, and for what kind of injury—follow. 
Though the well-being of small islands has been a stated concern since the 
UNFCCC’s inception, attention to loss and damage at the UNFCCC began in 
earnest in 2007 with the Bali Action Plan.118  The Plan called for enhanced 
adaptation efforts, including strategies and means to address loss and damage in 
developing countries, particularly for those most vulnerable.119  In 2010, the 
Cancun Adaptation Framework noted that approaches to address loss and damage 
should consider impacts, including sea-level rise, increasing temperatures, and 
ocean acidification.120  It further recognized the “need to strengthen international 
cooperation and expertise in order to understand and reduce loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts related to 
extreme weather events and slow-onset events.”121  Most recently, Decision 
3/CP.18 of the COP 18 meetings in Doha recognizes the importance of the work on 
loss and damage, including the need to build “comprehensive climate risk 
management approaches.”122  It also calls for advanced understanding of 
noneconomic loss and damage, patterns of migration and displacement, and 
identification and development of approaches to rehabilitate from climate-related 
loss and damage.123  Further, the Doha Gateway mandated the formation of 
“institutional arrangements, such as an international mechanism, including its 
functions and modalities” for the next COP.124  Given the staunch opposition the 
loss and damage proposal has received in the past, it took many by surprise when 
it assumed a central role in the Doha climate negotiations.125  Although the 
proposal has suffered setbacks in the interim, it remains firmly on the agenda. 
The equivocation on the part of member countries, particularly large emitters, is 
 
118. UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, 13th Sess., Decision 1/CP.13, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008). 
119. Id. at ¶ 1(c)(iii). See also id. at ¶¶ 1(c)(i), 1(c)(ii), 1(c)(iii) and 1(c)(v) on adaptation, as well as ¶¶ 
1(e)(i), 1(e)(ii), 1(e)(iii), 1(e)(iv), 1(e)(v), and 1(e)(vi) on finance and investment. 
120. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 16th Sess., Decision 1/CP.16, U.N. Doc. FCCC 
/CP/2010/7/Add.1, (Mar. 15, 2011); see also SBI Review, supra note 4, at 23.  
121. Id. at ¶ 25. 
122. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 18th Sess., Decision 1/CP.18, U.N. Doc. FCCC 
/CP/2010/7/Add.1, (Feb. 28, 2013). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. Although this mandate suffered setbacks in the most recent international meetings in Bonn, a 
loss and damage mechanism remains a key deliverable. See Laurie Goering, Africa: Vulnerable 
States Decry Slow Progress at Bonn Climate Talks, ALLAFRICA (June 17, 2013), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201306181411.html. 
125. Loss and Damage Reflects New Era of the Climate Talks, supra note 5. 
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not surprising, though it may be foolhardy.126  At the same time that some of the 
largest emitters resist aggressive climate action at the international scale, there 
are significant sources suggesting that climate change is a global risk best 
addressed now.  In the United States, the military infrastructure, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and numerous nongovernmental organizations have stressed 
the security and human development risks that climate disruption presents, 
particularly in the developing world.127  Similar to the larger discussion regarding 
international aid, the costs of failed livelihoods, retarded development, and 
climate-related conflict dwarf the value of each dollar allocated for optimally 
achievable well-being and security worldwide.128   
Given the geopolitical risks, a claims resolution facility that serves disaster 
relief and social welfare goals will aid the most vulnerable as well as the largest 
emitters.129  The CRC would provide a social safety net that attempts to meet the 
fundamental needs of each claimant, thus stunting overall regional and global 
instability.   
1. Guiding Principles 
There are several guiding principles that might govern the CRC from conception 
to implementation.  As demonstrated by the UNCC, and discussed in the next 
section, an expansive and flexible view of compensable harm vis-à-vis 
environment-based damages is necessary.  Further, due to the progressive nature 
of climate change and our scientific understanding of its complexity, the ultimate 
impacts and the ability to link them to climate inputs will necessarily shift.  For 
these reasons, it will be especially important that the CRC has clear guiding 
principles that will allow for consistency across claims over time.  This subsection 
 
126. It is not surprising because of stated concerns regarding liability. The two-decade-old mandates of 
the Framework Convention require climate action along the mitigation to rehabilitation 
spectrum, thus vitiating the need to determine fault. 
127. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency’s explains that the effects of climate change “are 
threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental 
degradation, political instability, and social tensions—conditions that can enable terrorist activity 
and other forms of violence.” Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 8 
(2014), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf; see also Dan Smith 
& Janani Vivekenanda, Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Understanding the linkages, 
shaping effective responses, INTERNATIONAL ALERT 8 (Nov. 2009), http://www.internationalalert. 
org/sites/default/files/publications/Climate_change_conflict_and_fragility_Nov09.pdf. 
128. See generally Barack Obama, Remarks at the United Nations Climate Change Summit in New 
York City (Sept. 23, 2014), in 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 691. 
129. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1365-66 (arguing 
that a “metaphor or paradigm” for the facility is critical for the public perception of claims 
resolution). McGovern notes that the “welfare paradigm is that of a social safety net to insure that 
no fundamental needs are unmet. There is no implication of wrongdoing or malfeasance.” Id. at 
1366. 
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suggests the following approaches to the CRC’s purpose and goals: international 
solidarity and equity, rough justice, and scientific and technical rigor throughout 
the life of the commission.   
International solidarity and equity is a theoretical hallmark of reparative 
efforts.130  In this context, international solidarity captures the overarching notion 
that the CRC is the product of a collaborative effort of each nation to facilitate the 
best outcomes for all other nations and their citizens.  Demonstrations of solidarity 
will differ across nations.  For the developed world, emerging economies, and the 
largest present and historical emitters, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR)131 will still operate.  In practice, that might mean that 
although all nations contribute to a global pool to fund the CRC,132 the CRC 
secretariat will calculate contributions based on principles of CBDR, thus requiring 
more input from the larger emitters.  For the most vulnerable, there might be 
other demonstrations of solidarity, namely the commitment not to pursue liability 
claims against the largest present and historical emitters.133  In other words, the 
CRC would be the repository for all climate-related claims for compensation and 
rehabilitation between states, and beneficiary states would waive all potential 
outstanding disputes regarding climate-related reparations from other 
participating states.134   
Regarding international equity, some elements of this principle will be easier to 
execute than others.  For example, including all affected parties in the negotiations 
regarding the creation of the facility through its operation should be 
straightforward.  As with the UNCC, equity at the claims level will also be key.  
Predictability and transparency in the determination and distribution of damages 
will ensure horizontal equity and maintain the legitimacy of the CRC.135  
Similarly, with the advent of triggering events likely occurring over a substantial 
 
130. AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 3. 
131. UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art 3.1 (“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit 
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”). 
132. See further discussion infra Part III.B. 
133. The extent to which a claims resolution process precludes a claimant’s right to pursue alternative 
venues for relief is a threshold issue. See CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, MASTER GUIDE 
TO MASS CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITIES 115 (2010). Waivers of litigation can come in multiple 
forms, including, limitation on the type of damages available, limitation on the entities against 
which claimant’s can pursue litigation, and the foreclosure (w.c.) of limitation altogether. Id. 
134. This commitment would not, of course, preclude claims by countries or their citizens against other 
viable defendants, such as corporations, in viable fora. See, e.g., Burkett, A Justice Paradox, supra 
note 12. This departs from the modern trend toward the principle of non-exclusivity, which 
countenances claimants bringing claims in alternative forums, in addition to the international 
claims institution. Bederman, supra note 91, at 34. 
135. See McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1378. 
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period of time—perhaps even a century or more—this facility will need to operate 
for quite some time while ensuring equity of treatment over generations, thus 
ensuring vertical equity.  As much as possible the standards of compensation 
should not change sharply or without clear scientific reasoning.136  Of course, 
claims will shift over time.  As with any claims resolution facility, flexibility to 
adapt to changed circumstances is essential.137  To ensure legitimacy in 
implementation, internal and external quality control audits governed by the third 
goal of the CRC138 will also be critical.  
Although the CRC can strive toward an optimal and consistent distribution of 
funds for rehabilitation, the size of potential claimants and the nature of climate 
change—marked by unpredictable, stochastic, and accelerating shifts—means that 
the CRC will fail to adequately compensate all claimants.  In fact, short of 
aggressive mitigation commenced several decades ago, there exist unavoidable and 
irreversible impacts that make restoration of the status quo ante in some cases 
impossible.  Further, assuming full and enthusiastic participation, it is unlikely 
that countries could sufficiently capitalize the CRC.  For these and related reasons, 
notions of rough justice are relevant.  Although the CRC cannot preclude all 
negative outcomes for small island states, it can, given the circumstances, facilitate 
better outcomes. 
Rough justice has been used to describe the aim of other claims facilities with 
similarly large and compelling groups of claimants.139  This principle will be even 
more relevant in guiding appropriate responses in the climate context.140  As 
described by scholar Francis E. McGovern, “‘rough justice’ embodies the 
philosophical conflict between fairness and efficiency . . . [; it] errs on the side of 
efficiency, arguably sacrificing equity in individual cases in order to achieve equity 
for the whole.”141  According to McGovern, pragmatism was the hallmark of the 
UNCC, for which the principle of rough justice was integral.  To ensure any means 
of compensation at all, pragmatism will also need to operate for SIDS and the 
CRC.  There will be a large and growing number of claimants appealing for 
assistance in increasingly dangerous circumstances.  Further, and perhaps 
fundamentally unique to the climate predicament, many of the harms 
anticipated—including total loss of territory and culture—are largely incalculable.  
Any attempt at compensation on this front will be more of a gesture rather than an 
 
136. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 370.  
137. See McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1378. 
138. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
139. See Caron & Morris, supra note 101, at 188. 
140. See Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, supra note 103, at 1608. 
141. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 
92, at 172 n.14. 
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accurate reflection of the true loss.  In this context, therefore, full compensation 
would be impossible due to insufficient funds, literally and figuratively.   
To come close to an adequate and appropriate method for claims resolution, 
funding for scientific and technological rigor over time will also be essential.  This 
would need to be a core part of a highly disciplined while adaptive organizational 
structure.142  In other words, to make any legitimate attempt at identifying 
triggering events, linking them to the harm experienced by a claimant, and 
assessing adequate remedy, the CRC administration will require sufficient funding 
for its technical operations in addition to the ability to compensate satisfactorily.  
Indeed, the “application of state-of-the-art decision making tools to assist the 
Commission to reach their decisions” allowed the UNCC to process and pay 
millions of disparate claims in a remarkably short amount of time.143  The 
technical arm would make the following determinations at the inception of the 
CRC and regularly throughout the life of the commission: it would, inter alia, 
define relevant concepts like “damage due to slow-onset events,” “environmental 
and natural resources damage,” and “climate-induced migration;”144 recommend 
criteria for valuing the previous climate-related events; and consider the 
appropriate level of financial compensation.145 
A variation of this technical component has also been key to the AOSIS 
proposal.146  In their proposal for incorporating insurance in the UNFCCC Process, 
AOSIS recommends learning from the experiences of the Executive Board of the 
Clean Development Mechanism.147  In addition to the need to have adequate 
 
142. On the importance of considering the “longitudinal form” of an organization design, see 
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1369-70 (“If the 
claims resolution facility is to allocate a certain sum to claimants over any extended period of 
time, there will be a disproportionate ratio of administrative cost to damage payments as they 
facility winds down. Thus, what way be an efficient organization in the early stages of the life of a 
facility may not be economical as it ages.”). 
143. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 
92, at 189. The disaggregation of claims into “digestible segments” also aided in the speedy 
resolution of claims, according to McGovern. This would be necessary for the CRC as well, 
discussed infra Part III.B.  
144. Of course, this determination will be immensely difficult. Defining climate-induced migration, for 
example, is currently the source of hot academic debate. Maxine Burkett, Climate-Induced 
Migration: Is there a there there?, 3 CLIMATE LAW 314 (2012) (reviewing MIGRATION AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE (Etienne Piguet et al. eds., 2011)). This is not as difficult an issue for SIDS, as climate-
induced migration is more straightforward for these nation-states. See id.  
145. UNEP, supra note 111, at 115. 
146. See Alliance of Small Island States, Workshop on the AOSIS Proposal, Full Report on Roundtable 
Discussions, Insurance in the UNFCCC Process (Sept. 11, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
AOSIS Insurance]. 
147. Poor funding, uneven participation, and suggestions of poor governance, among other things, have 
riddled the CDM since its inception. See, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, INT’L RIVERS, TRADING IN 
FAKE CARBON CREDITS: PROBLEMS WITH THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (2008), available 
at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/foe_ir_cdm_fact_sheet_final3_10-08.pdf. 
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funding at the outset, as well as autonomy from investor countries, AOSIS isolates 
“the need for a technical committee that does the actual work” as an important 
element for their proposed loss and damage mechanism.  This will be critical in 
real time, but will also be a key part of ensuring the CRC’s relevance and 
effectiveness on an ongoing basis.148   A scientific and technical arm of the CRC 
will be a key part of internally reviewing the efficacy of its claims review and 
disbursement.  This arm can establish a method of review to adapt claims criteria 
or claims processing guidelines to address necessarily changing circumstances.    
2. Addressing Antecedent Questions 
As contemplated in this article, the Small Islands Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Commission would follow the precedent of other claims resolutions 
facilities that have operated under the inquisitorial model of decision-making.149  
Distinct from adversarial procedures that are the hallmark of American litigation 
and other common law courts, the CRC would emphasize “truth-seeking and 
participation.”150  To that end, language and culturally appropriate notice to 
claimants, low access costs through standardized forms151 or regional offices for 
claims administration, and direct access to the CRC rather than through counsel 
will be key features. 
Coherent parameters to determine the “who, what, and how much” of the 
commission will aid the inquisitorial process.  Below, I provide preliminary 
answers to the following antecedent questions: What events will give rise to 
claims?  Who is and is not eligible for compensation?  Who will fund the CRC at the 
outset and throughout the life of the commission?  And, because most claims will 
not ripen until the advent of some climate-related event, when will payouts occur? 
Eligible Claims.  Generally speaking, loss and damage resulting from slow-onset 
events for which insurance is inadequate will be eligible for compensation.  Similar 
to the UNCC process, the U.N. Environment Programme could convene a working 
 
148. McGovern explains, “If equity is viewed longitudinally, there may be a similar uneven payment of 
claims over time. Typically, future claimants are in a disadvantageous position in negotiations 
today.” McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1385; In 
light of this challenge to vertical equity that inheres to a long-range facility, adequate and 
consistent funding for administration will be especially important. Defined and acceptable error 
rates, and a clear mechanism to monitor them, is also important to ensure that the compensation 
funding is going to those that actually need it. See id. at 1387. A commitment to technical rigor 
can incorporate vigilant fraud prevention in its operation. 
149. See generally id. at 1368. 
150. Id. (“The organization is more reminiscent of the inquisitorial model of the courts of equity rather 
than the adversarial mode of the common law courts.”). 
151. Again, the UNCC provides precedent for this. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 343 
(“The standard claim forms designed and distributed by the Secretariat to capture data in a 
consistent and uniform manner.”). 
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group to draft a comprehensive report to identify the boundaries of compensable 
claims.  Like the UNCC Working Group, it would also be appropriate for the CRC 
working group to favor broad and “non-exhaustive” definitions of terms.152  For the 
UNCC, the “environment” relevant to claimant countries included:  
The land within its boundaries (including subsoil); internal 
waters (including lakes, rivers and canals); territorial sea 
(including seabed, subsoil and resources thereof); airspace above 
its land; and exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to 
the extent that damage occurred to resources over which it has 
jurisdiction or sovereign rights in accordance with international 
law.153 
Similarly expansive, the Working Group defined “environmental damage” or 
“impairment to the environment” as “a change which has a measurable adverse 
impact on the quality of a particular environment or any of its components 
including its use and nonuse values and its ability to support and sustain an 
acceptable quality of life and a viable ecological balance.”154  Indeed, claimants 
might recover for unpleasant circumstances resulting from significant loss.  
Further, the working group for slow-onset climate compensation, like the UNCC, 
could conclude that the CRC will determine “adverse impact . . . on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account the situation before and after the relevant harmful 
activity occurred.”155  Finally, and perhaps most relevant to the case at hand, the 
Working Group defined “other environmental damage” to include recovery for 
permanent damage, for which restoration was infeasible.156 
The Cancun Adaptation Framework serves a good starting point on physical 
impacts for a CRC report.  The Framework identified the following as events 
 
152. Rep. of the Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Envtl. Damage Arising 
from Military Activities, U.N. Environment Programme, 7-8, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Env.Law/3/Inf.1 
(1996) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group of Experts]. The Working Group adopted equally 
expansive definitions for “natural resources,” “depletion of natural resources,” and “damage to 
natural resources.” See id. at 122-24. See also Juni, supra note 113. This will, of course, be a 
difficult, ongoing task. See Report of the Working Group of Experts, at 121 (“[I]t is conceivable 
that the question of whether damages are direct may not be uniquely apparent. This possibility 
arises because of the physical interdependence of certain environmental and natural resources, 
resulting in damage of a type, or other location, which might be too remote to be considered as 
compensable damage. For these cases, establishing a general rule as to which claims would be too 
remote to be praised will be a difficult task.”). 
153. Report of the Working Group of Experts, supra note 152, at 123. 
154. Id. 
155. Id.  The Working Group’s “report and conclusions set forth some general principles which may be 
applicable to all environmental claims, although the question of whether compensation could be 
awarded in any particular case must depend on its own facts.” Id. at 116. 
156. Id. at 128. The primary goal of the UNCC vis-à-vis the environment was restoration. To the 
extent that restoration or replacement was not possible, monetary damages were in order. Id. at 
14. 
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within the scope of any loss and damage mechanism: sea-level rise, increasing 
temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, 
land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity, and desertification.157  The causal 
link between these events occurring and anthropogenic climate change is relatively 
linear, with sea-level rise, ocean acidification, and increasing sea and land 
temperatures among the most straightforward.  Over time, scientific advances 
might make it easier to link other slow-onset events to global emissions.  Of course, 
there are many actions that contribute to the damage that sea-level rise and ocean 
acidification can produce, such as poor coastal land-use planning and inadequate 
or permissive fisheries management, respectively.  The CRC, and particularly its 
technical arm, will have to make sensible determinations about where climate 
inputs end and contributory action begins.  This would likely be relevant for claims 
at the government level rather than for individual claims.158  Finally, the 
compensation for reasonable monitoring of the further effects of these events would 
be appropriate, and has significant precedent, including the UNCC.159 
To the extent that the CRC is limited to SIDS, impacts within terrestrial and 
marine geographic regions should be relevant to the claimant country or its 
citizens.  The UNCC employed a similar concept with the so-called “compensable 
area” as a “presumptive indicator of a direct loss.”160  This would aid SIDS as the 
passing of certain thresholds for sea-level rise or ocean pH in certain regions to 
facilitate rapid claims resolution and funds distribution.  It would be particularly 
helpful for the efficient resolution of individual claims.  If a coastal region is no 
longer habitable and is within a designated compensable area, all of the 
inhabitants can file for compensation, with the attendant evidentiary burdens 
 
157 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2009, Decision 
1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 
2011).   
158. This is the case because, like the UNCC, the CRC will likely disburse a set award for small 
individual claims.  See discussion infra regarding claims categories.   
159. See Report of the Working Group of Experts, supra note 152, at 128 (discussion of “reasonable 
monitoring of environmental damage” and “abatement and prevention measures”). The Working 
Group concluded that “monitoring and assessment expenditures should be recoverable by 
governments in respect of damage occurring within their own territory; in some cases this may 
include monitoring and assessment activities . . . outside of national territory in order to assess 
potential impacts within territory.” Id. See also Caron & Morris, supra note 101, at 185 
(explaining that investigating the possibility of damage is itself compensable); Farber, Basic 
Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, supra note 103, at 1647 (explaining that 
“[a]warding compensation for such preventive measures is supported by the following sources: 
U.S. toxic tort law as it relates to medical monitoring expenses; UNCC practice, in its use of 
adaptation measures and the cost of providing alternate ecosystem services; and the preference 
for replacement damages under CERCLA and other schemes”). 
160. Caron & Morris, supra note 101, at 193. 
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eased.  This might also help ensure that future compensable damage is at least 
geographically bounded, thus avoiding claims for loss and damage due to remote 
environmental disruptions with more tenuous causal links to the climate-related 
slow-onset event.161 
It is also plausible that the CRC could consider and compensate for intangible, 
noneconomic losses.  Indeed, this was a consideration for the UNCC, which 
included archaeological and culturally significant artifacts in the broad definition 
of “environment,” with the attendant expectations of remediation.162  As a symbolic 
gesture, the CRC can determine a means to compensate and rehabilitate for losses 
related to loss of culture and territory.  Whereas the latter might also include 
actual monetary compensation for the costs of displacement and lost access to 
natural resources, the Commission could establish a protocol for addressing the 
perhaps weightier loss of culture some islanders will likely experience.  The UNCC 
provides precedent for including “cultural heritage, features of the landscape and 
environmental amenity.”163  This would be especially relevant for Pacific island 
countries, in which the majority is indigenous with cultures that have retained 
“profound cultural and spiritual connection” to nature and place.164 
In sum, the CRC’s jurisdiction would extend only to loss and damage suffered 
that is more likely than not due to slow-onset events.165  The CRC’s technical arm 
would define these events, consistent with changing scientific knowledge over time.  
To facilitate this task, the CRC should also coordinate initial funds to support the 
early establishment of baselines to aid in determining the extent of damage 
incurred relevant to a fixed point in time.166 
Eligible Claimants.  There are potentially billions of claimants if the eligibility 
question is not answered clearly and coherently.  As mentioned at the outset, this 
article constructs the CRC around the possible claims of the SIDS.  The SIDS alone 
total almost 60 million people.  All may not have claims; however, one can imagine 
expanding eligible claimants in time if the mission of the CRC also grows to cover 
 
161. A similar limitation was proposed in the context of wartime environmental damage in McManus, 
supra note 113, at 442. 
162. See Report of the Working Group of Experts, supra note 152; see also McManus, supra note 113, 
at 442. 
163. Report of the Working Group of Experts, supra note 152, at 10. 
164. See Techera, supra note 6, at 342-44. 
165.  See Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, supra note 103, at 1635-39 
(discussing various models to predict the possibility of damages for purposes of compensating 
climate change victims). Full explication of this piece is beyond the scope of this article. 
166. IPCC, supra note 23, at 10 (“This would be critical, particularly in light of the dearth of data on 
“disasters and disaster risk reduction . . . at the local level, which can constrain improvements in 
local vulnerability reduction.”); Sand, supra note 96, at 431 (stating that faced with a similar lack 
of reliable data, “the UNCC started by awarding funds upfront for monitoring and assessment of 
the damage. Total funding for this purpose amounted to $243.6 million.”). 
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other vulnerable communities.  This would be consonant with the goals and spirit 
of the commission contemplated here.  What is clear, however, is that the CRC 
would exclude countries like China that also have massive coastlines that sea-level 
rise threatens.  They, and others similarly situated, would not be eligible by virtue 
of their current emissions rate coupled with an enormous economy. 
Individual citizens of small island nations would be eligible to bring claims 
identified above.  To avoid the piecemeal presentation of individual claims, and the 
attendant administrative burdens and possibilities for delay, island governments 
will file consolidated claims on their citizens’ behalf.167  Mimicking the UNCC 
process, the CRC would require governments to compile and present their 
nationals’ claims using the governments’ own preferred methods and 
procedures.168  The UNCC established rules for the proper presentation of claims 
by nationality and, for most individuals, the country representing their claims was 
also the state of their nationality.169 Countries were also responsible for 
distributing awards.170 
Uniquely relevant to the SIDS’ circumstances, the UNCC also provided 
procedures for claims brought by stateless citizens.171  The phenomenon of 
“drowning” island nations and deterritorialized states has recently been the topic 
of substantial scholarly inquiry.172  It is possible that in a few decades claims will 
come from citizens of low-lying atoll nations, who have been entirely 
deterritorialized, seeking compensation for their displacement.  For the UNCC, an 
“exceedingly tricky problem” was determining which government would espouse 
the claims of Palestinians forced to depart Iraq or Kuwait, many of whom were 
stateless or lacking appropriate travel documents.173  The Governing Council of the 
UNCC ultimately decided that the UNCC itself and relevant UN agencies, such as 
the High Commissioner for Refugees, would assume the functions of collecting and 
 
167. See Bederman, supra note 91, at 30. 
168. Id. For more in depth discussion of process, see generally id. Countries could also submit claims 
for other persons resident in their country, including permanent residents, refugees, and asylum-
seekers. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 333. 
169. See Bederman, supra note 91, at 30.  
170.  See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 365 (describing commission rules regarding distribution 
of awards and the meticulous reporting requirements detailing country arrangements and 
progress). 
171. See Bederman, supra note 91, at 30; See also Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 333. For 
further discussion of the phenomenon of climate-induced migration, see generally Maxine 
Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood, and the Post-
Climate Era, 2 CLIMATE L.J. 345 (2011).   
172. See generally Maxine A. Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 89 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory 
Wannier eds., 2013). 
173. See Bederman supra note 91, at 30.   
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presenting claims.174   
Related to the predicament of stateless UNCC claimants, it is possible that 
countries beyond the SIDS can pursue viable claims for hosting the climate 
displaced.  The issue of who will absorb these costs has emerged without sufficient 
resolution.175  The CRC might provide one avenue for subsidizing migration for 
islanders.  The UNCC provides precedent for this kind of payout as well, as several 
awards went to governments “outside the region, who had come to the assistance of 
victim countries . . . by accommodating refugees.”176  There may be other scenarios 
in which third parties, not squarely contemplated here, could seek compensation 
for absorbing costs related to the loss and damage AOSIS member countries 
experience.177 
In sum, citizens and governments of AOSIS countries are eligible to bring 
claims.  Governments will represent the claims of their nationals as well as claims 
regarding environmental damage brought on the government’s own behalf. 
The Global Pool.  AOSIS envisages a mechanism supported by an international 
solidarity fund to compensate for economic and noneconomic losses.178  The sums 
required to fund operation of the CRC, as well as adequate compensation over 
time, will be substantial.  One cannot overstate this.  As UNCC scholars have 
warned, capital for this kind of facility will likely fail to meet the scope of the 
Commission and the scale of loss and damage it seeks to blunt.179  Nonetheless, 
decisions made regarding relative contribution to the fund can set the stage for a 
viable and solvent fund. 
The most common recommendations for relative contributions to the pool have 
been based on a country’s contribution to global emissions and its ability to pay.180  
Introducing a slight variant, some have suggested using historical emissions to 
determine relative contributions for initial capitalization of the pool, followed by 
 
174. Id. at 31. This was considered “a truly novel procedure;” however, as Bederman explains, “it 
probably is, although it may have its origins in the practice of earlier claims tribunals in which 
countries were permitted to espouse the claims of non-nationals to whom they had extended their 
protection.” Id. 
175. See generally Sand, supra note 96, at 430. 
176. Id. at 431 (emphasis in original). 
177. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group of Experts, supra note 152, at 122 (explaining that the 
“[g]eneral view was that the possibility of claims by states in relation to damaged areas beyond 
national jurisdiction should not be excluded, provided that a clear legal interests could be 
demonstrated”). 
178. Talakai, supra note 3; AOSIS Insurance, supra note 146. 
179. See Caron, supra note 87, at 274 (“There often are no funds for compensation after a catastrophe. 
When there are funds, they almost always will be smaller than that required to satisfy all that is 
likely to be awarded for the consequences of the disaster.”). 
180. See generally SBI Views & Information, supra note 40; AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48 (describing 
the funding scheme for the “Convention Adaptation Fund,” on which the funding for the Multi-
Window Mechanism is based). 
13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2015) 
116 
ongoing maintenance payments based on current emissions.  Both 
recommendations may run into resistance by the largest emitters.  Contributions 
based on greenhouse gas emissions suggest a link between payment level and 
responsibility for anthropogenic climate change.181  Although that is the basis for 
contribution to adaptation efforts and other features of the UNFCCC,182 “donor 
fatigue” on the part of contributing nations may dampen prospects for the CRC.  
Industrialized nations that have great funding requirements, consistent with 
principles of common but differentiated responsibility, may display greater 
hesitation.  There is some indication that this fatigue is crippling the early 
capitalization of the Green Climate Fund.183  The fact that all nations would have 
to contribute—not just Annex I countries—might, however, ease the discussion of 
emissions-based contribution.  All countries would provide funds based on their 
current emissions rates, which today will include sizeable contributions from 
developing states.184  Indeed, the rate of current emissions suggests that larger 
developing country contributions in the future are quite conceivable.185 
There are, of course, myriad ways in which the CRC could secure funding, at 
least initially.186  Other suggestions include linking compensation to a country’s 
failure to mitigate187 or by introducing a “tax on the use of the commons,”188 in this 
case the atmospheric commons.  Island nations also contemplate additional 
contributions from bilateral and multilateral sources and other actors, such as 
private donors, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental 
organizations.189   
 
181. It is important to note here that least develop countries and SIDS contribute just over 1% of 
global emissions, combined. See Techera, supra note 6, at 348.   
182. See generally UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 3. 
183. See AOSIS Expert Meeting, supra note 59. 
184. Tol and Verheyen explain, “If one counts all emissions from the time governments could have 
known about climate change, OECD responsibility is large. If one starts counting at the time 
climate change was officially recognised as a policy problem, OECD responsibility is much 
smaller.” Tol & Verheyen, supra note 54, at 1127. 
185. Tol and Verheyen go even further, stating:  
 Developing countries may be held responsible for their future emissions, which cannot 
be excused by a lack of knowledge about the consequences or a lack of technological 
alternatives. Scenarios under which the responsibilities of developing countries exceed 
those of developed countries, and the net compensation flows are from South to North 
are not inconceivable. 
 Id. Based on current emissions and likely future capacity, this should not be a concern for 
developing countries like the SIDS and least developed countries. 
186. See, e.g., Millar et al., supra note 11, at 444-45 (discussing funding for an international insurance 
pool). 
187. And, of course, the more aggressive the mitigation, the lower the contributions to the global pool. 
188. AOSIS Expert Meeting, supra note 59. 
189. AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48. For other novel funding sources, see Rosemary Lyster, A Fossil 
Fuel-Funded Climate Disaster Response Fund under the UNFCCC Loss and Damage Mechanism 
(Univ. of Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13/77, 2013); Randall S. Abate, 
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The forms of compensation may also vary and have been diverse in other claims 
resolution facilities.190  Monetary compensation is the norm, but in-kind payments 
are also plausible.  This might include property repair, outreach assistance, and 
perhaps unique to the SIDS circumstances, host country support of climate-
induced migrants.   
In sum, all UNFCCC parties will pay into a global pool from which countries 
will receive a payout or in-kind compensation based on their losses. 
Triggering Events.  Compensation is appropriate at two primary points—now 
and at the time of a triggering event.  There are some payments that could occur 
immediately upon the institution of the CRC.  Funding for establishing and 
recording environmental baselines and introducing reasonable monitoring of slow-
onset events will be important for SIDS, who for the most part suffer from a dearth 
of relevant data and research capacity.191  Recorded baselines would be key to 
determining triggers for compensation.192  Governments would pursue these funds.   
Perhaps the more challenging technical questions for the CRC will be to 
determine when a slow-onset event has caused damage sufficient to trigger the 
payment of claims.  For this determination, it would be best to borrow parametric 
approaches widely used in the insurance industry and suggested by AOSIS in their 
insurance proposal.  In other words, an individual or country’s claims would ripen 
once the impact of an event exceeds an agreed on level beyond the recorded 
baseline for that country.193  As AOSIS identifies in its proposal for rehabilitation 
and compensation payments in a Multi-Window Mechanism, parameters could 
include air temperature, precipitation events, wind speed, and soil salinity in 
addition to ocean acidity and sea-level rise.194   
As these are primarily scientific questions, the CRC’s technical arm will be 
critical for assessing where impacts exist and when payments are appropriate.  A 
preliminary consideration of plausible triggering events might also include the 
 
Corporate Responsibility and Climate Justice: A Proposal for a Polluter-Financed Relocation Fund 
for Federally Recognized Tribes Imperiled by Climate Change, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10 
(2013). 
190. See McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1373. 
191.  See IPCC, supra note 23, at 8 (stating that this would be critical, particularly in light of the dearth of 
data on “disasters and disaster risk reduction . . . at the local level, which can constrain 
improvements in local vulnerability reduction”); see also Alliance of Small Island States, Informal 
Dialogue on Loss and Damage, Nov. 7–8, 2012 at 4-6 [hereinafter AOSIS Dialogue Nov. 2012]. There 
are “significant institutional, financial and technical gaps in countries' ability to assess Loss and 
Damage. These included gaps in tools, data and the capacity to use the tools and conduct 
assessments.” Id. 
192. See Millar et al., supra note 11, at 461. 
193. AOSIS suggest that “[f]or payouts using parametric approaches, different metrics might be 
applied in different countries.” AOSIS Insurance, supra note 146, at 8. 
194. AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 7. 
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following: unremitting storm surge, inundation, and infrastructure damage above 
an agreed on sea-level baseline; significant regional reef ecosystem collapse or the 
extinction of a particular marine species;195 and migration of the majority of 
country residents beyond the baseline. 
The valuation of damages will be exceedingly difficult.  Creating a standing 
work group committed to providing appropriate definitions and methodologies for 
valuing harm from economic and noneconomic loss and damage over time will be 
an indispensible, early task for the CRC.  This group may be housed under the 
technical arm of the CRC. 
In sum, the need for financial assistance to establish and record baselines is 
immediate.  To the extent it is not completed sufficiently under a disaster risk 
component, claims based on setting baselines and monitoring and prevention will 
ripen at the founding of the CRC.  Parametric indicators will govern the ripening of 
claims due to slow-onset events. 
B. The Structure of the Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Commission 
The structure of the CRC would be consistent with AOSIS’s proposal for a multi-
window mechanism for loss and damage, situated under the Framework 
Convention and housed within the UNFCCC Secretariat.196  The mechanism board 
would provide oversight, and institutional arrangements would include technical, 
financial, and administrative functions, the latter provided by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat.  The Technical Advisory Facility and a Financial Vehicle would 
support the three mechanism components, including the rehabilitation and 
compensation component.  Specifically, the Technical Advisory Facility would, 
among other things, assist countries in establishing locally-relevant baseline 
parameters and verify when an event exceeded parameters.  It would operate with 
input from the insurance sectors and the disaster risk reduction community, as 
well as other UN organs.  The Financial Vehicle would manage Mechanism funds, 
including accumulating funds as well as paying out on claims made when 
 
195. For payments triggered by species loss, see Report of the Working Group of Experts, supra note 
152, at 130. The Working Group explained,  
 [O]ne could establish in lieu of case-by-case assessment of restoration and damage costs, 
a schedule of damages based, for example, on the loss of a particular bird–taking into 
account, its rarity among other things–such as schedule might be based on average 
restoration and damage costs. This practice is adopted in a number of national 
jurisdictions.   
Id. 
196. See generally AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 4. 
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parametric thresholds are exceeded.197 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. AOSIS’s proposed structure for a Multi-Window Mechanism to Address 
Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts. 
1. CRC Administration 
As is typical of other large claims resolution facilities,198 the CRC should have a 
governing entity of trustee-like appointees, claims administrators, financial and 
statistical consultants, and a sizeable staff, perhaps numbering in the hundreds.199  
A Governing Council and Panels of Commissioners would constitute the two main 
entities of the CRC, with the UNFCCC Secretariat providing critical 
administrative support to the Council and Commissioners.200  
  
 
197. The Financial Vehicle/Facility would be created inside the UNFCC, but could be housed at an 
external financial institution. Id. 
198. See McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 86, at 1369. 
199. See McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, supra 
note 92, at 172 (explaining that eventually the UNCC Secretariat staff grew to over 300 
employees). 
200. This parallels the UNCC’s governance structure. See Caron & Morris, supra note 101, at 186; see 
also Van Houtte et al., supra note 106.  
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Figure 3.  The proposed structure of the Small Islands Climate Compensation and 
Rehabilitation Commission. 
 
The Governing Council would be responsible for setting policy regarding the 
CRC fund and the procedures applicable to claims resolution.  It would “prescrib[e] 
a jurisprudence to be applied to classes of cases”201 through administrative 
decisions regarding the definition of terms,202 evidentiary and causation 
requirements, the quantum of damages, and the principles for handling issues 
such as late-filed claims, among other things.203  Representatives of parties to the 
UNFCCC would serve on the Council.  The Governing Council may also opt to use 
fixed compensation for some claims, particularly for those that are relatively small.  
For the UNCC, this approach would be advantageous for a number of reasons, 
including: the ability to establish modified evidentiary standards; the ability to 
ensure equality among successful claimants within the same claims categories; 
and increased efficiency due to the reduced length of argument regarding the 
precise extent of individual damages.204 
The Council may also designate certain claims categories for expedited 
treatment, both in the processing and payment stages.  Generally speaking, the 
Governing Council might require a statement from the claimant through his or her 
government and any additional relevant documentary evidence.205  The Council 
could relax evidentiary standards for small individual claims, reserving more 
 
201. Bederman, supra note 91, at 19. 
202. This would be done with the assistance of relevant working groups under the technical facility. 
203. See Bederman, supra note 91, at 20. 
204. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 365. 
205. This is typical for establishing eligibility, with the possibility for “surrogate criteria” when 
eligibility criteria are difficult to meet. See McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution 
Facilities, supra note 86, at 1370-71. 
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demanding standards for large claims.  Commentators have found this to be a fair, 
appropriate, and “humanitarian” approach for individual claimants seeking small, 
fixed sums for compensation and for whom documenting claims might be 
difficult.206 
The Panels of Commissioners would apply procedures adopted by the Council to 
the submitted claims.207  Commissioners would serve on panels and review and 
evaluate claims presented.  The panels would determine the admissibility, 
relevance, materiality, and weight of any submitted documents.208  Further, the 
commissioners could require certain elements for claims review, including: 
evidence of injury; evidence of the conduct that caused the injury; evidence of a 
direct relationship between the conduct and the injury; and elements of damages 
sought.209  Consistent with the inquisitorial model, the Commissioners would 
primarily fulfill the fact-finding function of the CRC.  Like the UNCC, the 
Commissioners should represent a diverse cross-section of the member countries 
acting in their individual capacities rather than as proxies for their national 
authorities.210  
The Technical Advisory Facility, outlined in the AOSIS proposal would be 
particularly important to the CRC.  This facility would need dedicated staff for the 
CRC, with deep expertise in relevant fields, from climate science to statistical 
modeling.  It should also house working groups that provide rigorous economic 
analysis for questions involving claim valuation.211 
Another element of the AOSIS proposal that is relevant here is the inclusion of a 
Chief Risk Officer.212  With slight modification, the CRC would engage the Chief 
Risk Officer as an agent of the UNFCCC residing in country.  The Chief Risk 
Officers would work independent of national authorities and would facilitate the 
CRC on the ground, from the commissioning of risk assessments to deciphering 
 
206. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 347. 
207. See generally McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, 
supra note 92, at 180-81. 
208. See Bederman, supra note 91, at 23 (citing UNCC Rules of Claims Procedure). AOSIS envisages 
the Financial Vehicle serving this purpose. See AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 7. Consistent 
with the mission of the CRC, I believe the Panel of Commissioners would be a more appropriate 
entity to review claims under the inquisitorial model of claims resolution. 
209. This is adapted from the UNCC Working Group’s expectations regarding the environmental 
panel’s review. See Report of the Working Group of Experts, supra note 152, at 126. The 
Governing Council can also simplify the evaluation of directness of loss for the commissioners by 
identifying a set number of factors that if present in a particular claim would establish the 
required causal link. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 334. This could be especially help 
for SIDS under the circumstances. 
210. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 332. 
211. See AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 4. 
212. See AOSIS Insurance, supra note 146, at 6. My proposal expands the list of responsibilities for the 
Chief Risk Officer. 
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risks requiring community and infrastructure relocation, to ensuring legitimate 
use of compensation awards by governments through auditing procedures. 
In closing, it is crucial not to understate the importance of efficient 
administration of the CRC.  The division of the Secretariat that assists the 
Commission will have a crucial role in claims processing.  Indeed for the UNCC, its 
Secretariat was the “driving force behind the design and development of efficient 
and fair mass claims processing techniques,”213 including the development and 
maintenance of a computerized claims database.214  It was the “workhorse for 
generating the substantive ideas, methodologies, and criteria for evaluating, 
processing and compensating claims.”215  A well-resourced Secretariat from diverse 
backgrounds216 would guarantee the effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of the 
entire commission. 
2. Plausible Claims Categories 
AOSIS envisions claims made for economic loss, such as lost revenue to the 
tourism or fishing industries, property loss and damage, cultural impacts, 
environmental damage and the cost of relocation in the event of loss of habitable 
territory.217  For ease of administration, however, it will be necessary to identify 
broader categories under which the CRC can make payments.  In practice, the 
Governing Council would divide the claims into coherent categories for processing 
and disposition.  The categories might include the following: 
• Category A would consist of individual claims for property 
damage and personal injury due to a triggering climate 
event.  The Governing Council would likely apply a fixed 
sum to similar claims.   
• Category B would consist of individual claims for economic 
loss due to a triggering climate event.  The Governing 
Council would likely apply a fixed sum to similar claims. 
• Category C would compensate climate-induced migrants, 
forced to leave their country of residence due to a triggering 
climate event.  Claimants would be eligible for fixed 
compensation for their dislocation, based on factors 
determined by the Governing Council.  Other possible 
 
213. Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 331. 
214. Id. at 330. 
215. Id. at 331. 
216. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 106, at 331 (“Cultural differences, including different legal and 
conceptual approaches to fairness and efficiency in context claims resolution, have led to a 
balanced and flexible approach to problems.”).  
217. Talakai, supra note 3; see AOSIS Proposal, supra note 48, at 7. 
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claimants might include countries that host substantial 
numbers of displaced islanders. 
• Category D claims would compensate individuals making 
claims for a variety of damages up to $100,000.  Claims 
might include migration, personal injury, and property loss 
and damage. 
• Category E claims would compensate individuals seeking 
more than $100,000 in compensation.  Elements of this claim 
would be identical to Category D, but because of the larger 
requested sum, claimants would need to adhere to more 
stringent procedures and higher evidentiary standards, such 
as a more detailed documentation of losses. 
• Category F claims would consist of government claims for 
their losses, including: loss of government property, 
evacuation costs, and damage to environmental and natural 
resources, including, for example, loss of value of or access to 
exclusive economic zones.218 
Categories A through C might benefit from expedited review, particularly for 
those with fixed compensation or sums totaling less than, say, $100,000, similar to 
the UNCC.  Further, like the UNCC, the CRC can decide to resolve certain claims 
first, depending on the “humanitarian urgency” that certain claims might 
introduce.219  Individuals that suffer the loss of their livelihoods, or loss of their 
already limited possessions, or can no longer inhabit ancestral homes would rightly 
enjoy “privileged treatment” at the CRC, given the dire circumstances.220 
Conclusion 
Critics from varied perspectives might declare the Small Island Compensation 
and Rehabilitation Commission unviable.  The hurdles are enormous.  Political will 
may be absent for the foreseeable future.  General skepticism about the efficacy of 
UNFCCC institutions abounds, with funding and management challenges already 
dogging existing efforts.  The cost and scale of the CRC, based on the framework 
sketched here, may seem prohibitive.  Notwithstanding these potential 
deficiencies, however, AOSIS has good reason to press its proposal.  For SIDS, this 
approach in concept and execution is necessarily suboptimal—all, I assume, would 
prefer that climate change did not so fundamentally compromise their futures.  
The CRC, however, may be a welcome alternative to the more formidable obstacles 
present in pursuing international litigation for climate-related loss and damage or 
 
218. The Pacific islands, for example, cover a large ocean expanse with EEZs totaling more than 
27,000,000 km2. Techera, supra note 6, at 339. 
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tackling unabated climate change without some assistance.  Further, the benefits 
to the global community are clear and copious when compared to the costs of 
delayed attempts to anticipate and manage slow-onset climatic processes.   
Of course, comparisons between the costs and benefits of action, on the one 
hand, and far costlier inaction, on the other, have not persuaded the largest 
emitters to act with prevention and precaution in mind.  There are a few 
significant exceptions noted above.  These countries provide hope that the AOSIS 
proposal and elaboration of component parts will have traction in the near term.  If 
not, it seems clear that the proposal will serve as evidence of yet another missed 
opportunity to avoid worst-case scenarios. 
